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Samuel D. Elzinga
a noTe from The ediTor-in-Chief
What an honor it is to mantle the responsibility of  editor-in-chief  
for this edition of  the UVU Journal of  National Security. Filling this role, 
I have at times felt quite inadequate when comparing myself  to past 
editors-in-chief, considering they are close friends and colleagues whom 
I hold in very high esteem. Much like our country’s national security 
landscape, however, the journal is constantly evolving. In the four semes-
ters I have been involved with the journal, both as an author, managing 
editor, and now editor-in-chief, I have witnessed the journal blossom 
and grow into a publication that continually raises the bar of  scholarship 
both at Utah Valley University and the greater scholarly community. 
This edition of  the journal, however, is unique. It is the first time 
we have published a piece from beyond the ranks of  UVU students and 
alumni, which was the next necessary and organic step for a journal of  
this caliber. This journal is the result of  hundreds of  collective hours 
spent on both the author and editor side to ensure the quality of  this 
publication remains consistent with previous journals. 
For me, this transition would not have been possible without a fabu-
lous roster of  motivated and bright individuals to get the pieces ready 
to publish. I would like to especially thank my executive editor, Bryce 
Krieger, and my managing editors, Cierra Peters and Mason Taylor, for 
their continued support and insight throughout the process of  publish-
ing this edition of  the journal. Without them, keeping the strict dead-
lines a journal like this demands would have been impossible. I would 
also like to thank Deb Thornton and her English class for the countless 
class hours they spent to ensure the journal was ready to publish. Lastly, 
I would like to thank our new faculty mentor, Dr. Gregory Jackson, for 
his sage advice throughout the publication process and for sharing the 
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vision to expand the journal beyond our university.
I am additionally excited to have the contributions of  Major 
General Jefferson Burton, Commanding General of  the Utah National 
Guard, and Dr. David McEntire, dean of  the College of  Health and 
Public Service, in this journal. I am sincerely grateful for their willing-
ness to share their expertise. In a time where rigorous discussion of  
security challenges are necessary, I sincerely hope this publication con-
tinues to contribute to the timely and necessary discussions we must 
participate in to ensure the best ideas are brought forth to solve these 
complex problems.
Samuel Elzinga
Editor-in-Chief
Journal of  National Security
Major General Jefferson Burton, United States Army, Retired,
Former Adjutant General,
Utah National Guard
foreWord: honoring ThoSe Who SerVed Before,  
75 yearS SinCe The d-day inVaSion
In a rapidly changing world, perhaps no topic is more relevant than 
that of  National Security. As a nation we face the complexities of  pro-
viding effective security for our citizens, while at the same time protect-
ing civil liberties. Maintaining this balance in a free society when facing 
totalitarian regimes and non-state actors that have no such constraints on 
power projection is the seminal challenge of  our generation. The diffi-
culties that we face, though not new, are multiplied by the rapid advance-
ment and access to game-changing technology that make it difficult to 
remain competitive.
It was our first President, George Washington who stated that “the 
most important thing we can occupy our time with is “the education of  
our children in the science of  government.” As students of  National 
Security, we must be diligent in educating ourselves. Having spent much 
of  my adult life in the third world, I have found that there are enough 
resources to feed and clothe all of  mankind, but selfishness, greed and 
bad governance make the distribution of  these resources virtually im-
possible. As Americans, we should be engaged in finding solutions to, 
first, ensure that we maintain our own Republic, and, second, that we 
show others how to leave chaos behind and develop functionality and 
stability of  governance.
Our history is replete with great examples of  personal self-sacrifice 
in the defense of  these principles. This year, we celebrated the 75th 
Anniversary of  the Normandy invasion, where thousands of  young 
Americans stormed heavily fortified beaches to retake Europe and end 
Fascist oppression. Casualties were high, and thousands of  our Soldiers 
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are laid to rest in cemeteries on the French coast. At the entrance to 
one of  these cemeteries, the words of  General Mark Clark are inscribed 
as a reminder to the world of  their sacrifice. He said, 
If  ever proof  were needed that we fought for a cause and 
not for conquest, it could be found in these cemeteries. 
Here was our only conquest: all we asked was enough soil in 
which to bury our gallant dead.
Our challenges are difficult ones, as we face aggressive peer com-
petitors, non-state actors, and global transnational criminal organiza-
tions—all seeking to challenge the supremacy of  the United States. It is 
done at home through orchestrated social media assaults; it is done on 
the high seas through piracy and the expansion of  naval reach; and it is 
done on land through conventional and guerilla border incursions, and 
criminal organizations that seek to get gain by destabilizing and even 
toppling governments. Now more than ever, it is critical that we are 
ready as a nation to face these and other dynamic threats. The safety and 
security of  the world depend upon our willingness to face these com-
plex challenges. No one has ever said it better than our third President, 
Thomas Jefferson, when he stated:
I have sworn upon the altar of  God, eternal hostility against 
all forms of  tyranny over the mind of  man.
May we re-dedicate ourselves to the maintenance of  individual liberty 
and collective freedom, which are the hallmarks of  the American Re-
public.
David A. McEntire, PhD and SFHEA
The dallaS eBola inCidenT aS an indiCaTor of The 
BioTerroriSm ThreaT: an aSSeSSmenT of reSponSe 
WiTh impliCaTionS for SeCuriTy and preparedneSS
inTroduCTion
In October of  2014, a man named Thomas Duncan traveled from 
Liberia to Dallas, Texas. He was unknowingly infected with Ebola and 
brought a very threatening disease to the United States. This, in turn, 
presented serious challenges for hospital administrators and public 
officials involved in the medical, public health, and emergency manage-
ment professions. Consequently, the Ebola incident serves as an im-
portant illustration of  what could happen in a potential bio-terrorism 
attack and is therefore a significant case for those involved in emergen-
cy management, public health, national security and homeland security. 
With this context in mind, the following article will discuss several 
of  the false assumptions made before and during the Ebola incident. It 
will also identify other challenges encountered in the response as well 
as recommended measures to better deal with the threat of  such out-
breaks or bio-terrorism attacks in the future. Before doing so, informa-
tion about the methods for this article will be provided as well as back-
ground information on Ebola.
meThodS
The findings of  this article are derived from a study undertaken by 
professors currently at Utah Valley University and the University of  
North Texas.1 The purpose of  the initial research was to explore how 
1 The authors express appreciation to the National Science Foundation for 
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government officials and emergency management personnel make de-
cisions with limited information in dynamic and uncertain environments. 
This initial research concentrated on how the Ebola case relates to the 
concepts of  spontaneous planning in emergency management and ex-
ecutive discretion in public administration. Qualitative research from this 
prior study, which included newspaper articles, after-action reports, and 
interviews with 20 key participants (mainly those working in emergency 
management), was adapted for the purpose of  this article. The data 
collected revealed how the response to the Ebola incident succeeded 
and where it fell short. The lessons learned will serve as the focal point 
of  the following article.
BaCkground on eBola
Previously known as Ebola hemorrhagic fever, Ebola is a rare and 
deadly disease caused by infection of  the Ebola virus strains (i.e., fam-
ily Filvoridae, genus Ebolavirus). Ebola can affect non-human primates, 
such as monkeys, chimpanzees, and gorillas, through the Reston virus 
(Reston ebolavirus). Ebola may also impact humans through four strains, 
including Zaire virus (Zaire ebolavirus), Sudan virus (Sudan ebolavirus), Taï 
Forest virus (Taï Forest ebolavirus), and Bundibugyo virus (Bundibugyo eb-
olavirus). Symptoms in humans may appear anywhere from 2 to 21 days 
after exposure, but the average is time of  onset is between 8 to 10 days. 
Symptoms include fever, severe headache, muscle pain, weakness, fa-
tigue, diarrhea, vomiting, abdominal pain, and hemorrhaging of  the 
eyes, ears, nose, and mouth. If  the virus is not treated quickly or with 
proper medicines and sophisticated medical techniques, death is likely 
to occur and the disease will spread.
For instance, one of  the most concerning outbreaks of  Ebola be-
gan in the African nation of  Guinea on December 28, 2013, when a 
two-year-old child died from hemorrhagic fever. By March 2014, 59 
deaths in Guinea were attributed to Ebola, and cases were subsequently 
reported in Liberia. Five months later, the World Health Organization 
put the death toll at 3,091 people and announced that the fatality rate 
was at an appalling 70%.
As this outbreak unfolded, a man named Thomas Duncan cared 
for his landlord’s daughter, who was infected with the disease. A short 
Award #1522547 and the IRB for Approval of  Human Subjects Application 
15-001.
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time later he boarded a plane from Africa and landed in Dallas, Texas, 
on September 19, 2014. Duncan started to run a fever on September 24 
and checked into the Presbyterian hospital the next day. Thinking that 
Duncan had some strain of  routine flu, doctors and nurses sent him 
home. Duncan’s condition continued to deteriorate, and on September 
28, Duncan returned to the hospital by ambulance and was isolated. 
Two days later, tests confirmed he was infected with Ebola. On Octo-
ber 8, 2014, Duncan succumbed to the disease and passed away.
During Duncan’s treatment in the hospital, two nurses were also 
infected. Nina Pham became the first person to be infected by Ebola 
transmission in the United States. She developed a fever on October 
10, 2014, and was isolated until she was declared Ebola free on Octo-
ber 24, 2014. Amber Vinson was another nurse who became concerned 
about possible infection when she felt sick while traveling to Ohio to 
make wedding plans. She returned to Dallas on October 13 and report-
ed to the hospital on October 14. She tested positive the next day, was 
treated, and declared Ebola free on October 22.
While the loss of  Duncan’s life from Ebola was undoubtedly tragic 
and the recovery of  infected nurses was fortunate, the large numbers 
of  fatalities in Africa and the spread of  the disease in the United States 
certainly illustrated the serious nature of  this outbreak. The Ebola epi-
sode severely challenged decision makers in the medical community and 
in local/state government, and the costs associated with treatment and 
response were substantial. Although this small occurrence in the US 
proved to be extremely difficult, a wide-scale outbreak would clearly be 
even more overwhelming. Learning from this case is therefore vital to 
understanding the risk of  bio-terrorism for those working for national 
security, homeland security, emergency management, and public health. 
Understanding the lessons of  this incident may ultimately save lives in 
the future.
falSe aSSumpTionS
One of  the greatest problems associated with the Ebola incident 
was in relation to several false assumptions leaders had about disease 
transmission, national preparedness, treatment protocols, and response 
capabilities. Problems were witnessed in at least six areas.
1. Officials from various government agencies as well as President Obama 
mistakenly assumed that the disease would not spread to other parts of  
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the world. Their public comments indicate that they believed the dis-
ease ws only present in Africa and that existing airport screenings 
would curtail the arrival of  Ebola in the United States. No additional 
travel bans were seriously considered.2 However, Dr. Thomas Frieden, 
the Director of  the CDC, admitted that in today’s world, “ultimately 
we are all connected.”3 Rep. Edward Royce, Chairman of  House Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, also stated that because of  the ease of  
world-wide travel, it should be recognized that “communicable diseases 
do not stop at borders.”4 Others likewise pointed out that our standards 
for health screenings during immigration were too lax. Consequently, a 
reporter from the Dallas Morning News noted that Duncan “evaded 
all of  the security measures in place to protect our nation from one of  
the deadliest diseases on the planet.”5 One concerned citizen expressed 
serious reservations about our immigration policies in a letter to the 
editor:
i. When we sent men to the moon and back, we kept them in isola-
tion for 30 days to prevent any unknown germ from infecting the 
earth. Now, someone coming to the US from a region rife with 
one of  the most deadly and highly infectious diseases can just hop 
on a crowded airplane, travel for hours and hop off  to blend in 
with the population.”6 
Recognizing this threat, Senator Rob Portman of  Ohio asserted that 
this case “serves as a reminder of  the need for increased US prevention 
efforts,” such as screening at the point of  entry in the United States.7
ii. A failure to take disease transmission seriously does not bode well 
for national security, homeland security, emergency management, 
2 Roberta Rampton, “‘Americans Can’t Give in to Hysteria or Fear’ Over 
Ebola: Obama,” Reuters, October 17, 2014, https://reuters.com/article/us-help-
ebola-usa/american-can’t-give-in-to-hysteria-or-fear-over-ebola-Obama-idUSKCN-
0l61BO20141018.
3 Craig Schneider, “First U.S. Ebola Case Confirmed in Texas,” Atlanta 
Journal-Constitution, October 1, 2014, https://www.ajc.com/news/national/
first-ebola-case-confirmed-texas/PfpG3dQTUi7fBRbjvOzg1M/.
4 Kelly Riddell, “After First Ebola Case, Red Flags Emerge That U.S. Unpre-
pared for Pandemic: Federal Reports Raise Concerns U.S. Defenses Stagnated, 
Waning,” Washington Times, September 30, 2014. https://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2014/sep/30/after-first-ebola-case-fears-turn-us-pandemic-prep/.
5 Tod Robberson, “The Common Link Between Ebola and the White House 
Breach,” Dallas Morning News, October 1, 2014. 
6 Bill Burris, “Letter to the Editor,” Dallas Morning News, 2014.
7 Riddell, “After First Ebola Case.”
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and public health.
2. Medical leaders also had incorrect beliefs about disease transmission. 
Officials, including CDC Director Frieden, believed that “the virus does 
not spread through the air—only through close contact with bodily 
fluids from a sick person.”8 Accordingly, it was assumed that blood, 
sweat, vomit, feces, urine, saliva, semen must penetrate skin or make 
contact with a cut. However, a concerned citizen pointed out that the 
CDC website reports that “if  a symptomatic patient with Ebola coughs 
or sneezes on someone, the saliva or mucus come into contact with 
that person’s eyes, nose or mouth, [and] these fluids may transmit the 
disease.”9 In addition, there was reason to believe that contaminated 
bed sheets and clothing as well as the insertion of  breathing tubes or 
removal of  protective gear could also spread the disease.10,11 Therefore, 
it appears that there may have been insufficient knowledge about dis-
ease transmission in this particular case of  Ebola.
3. Medical officials also seemed to be overly confident regarding their 
ability to diagnose and minimize the spread of  the disease. CDC Di-
rector Frieden stated, “I have no doubt we will control this case of  
Ebola.”12 Others, such as Dr. Scott Ries of  the Christian Medical and 
Dental Association asserted that “we know how to deal with Ebola,”13 
while Kyle Janek, Texas Health and Human Services Executive Com-
missioner, argued that “disease containment [. . .] is something we do 
every day.”14 In spite of  this confidence, various mistakes were made as 
this event unfolded. Thomas Duncan “came to the emergency room 
on a certain day saying that he felt sick, and mentioned that he had come 
from Liberia. [. . .] The dots were not connected—sick African man 
just got back from Liberia where there’s a major Ebola epidemic.”15 
8 Marilynn Marchione, “5 Things to Know about the U.S. Ebola Case,” 
September 30, 2014, https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/health/The-Dallas-
Ebola-Case-5-Things-to-Know-277677731.html.
9 Jacque Vilet, “Letter to the Editor,” Dallas Morning News, October 4, 2014, 
https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/2014/10/04/ebola-in-dallas/.
10 “Why Nation’s Top Docs Say.”
11 Nomaan Merchant, “Dallas Health Care Worker Tests Positive for Ebola,” 
October 17, 2014, https://www.theadvocate.com/nation_world/article_bcf1b997-
466e-5c69-aa9c-86b62b8c7c48.html.
12 Schneider, “First U.S. Ebola Case.”
13 Riddell, “After First Ebola Case.”
14 Robert T. Garrett, “Texans Enjoy Strong Protections Against Ebola, Janek 
Says.” Dallas Morning News, October 7, 2014, https://www.dallasnews.com/news/
politics/2014/10/07/texans-enjoy-strong-protections-against-ebola-janek-says/.
15 Todd J. Gillman, “Ebola: Dr. Fauci of  NIH Says Dallas Hospital Should 
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Furthermore, the hospital released him, and he was in the community 
for two days. A reporter noted that “someone should have asked more 
questions and didn’t. [. . .] They sent him home, and for the next three 
to four days, the patient was contagious and exposed others to Ebola 
in Dallas” (Robberson 2014).16 Dr. Daniel Varga, Chief  Clinical Officer 
with Texas Health Resources, commented, “Unfortunately, in our ini-
tial treatment of  Mr. Duncan, despite our best intentions and a highly 
skilled medical team, we made mistakes. We did not correctly diagnose 
his symptoms as those of  Ebola. We are deeply sorry.”17 Such errors, 
while understandable, can have grave consequences. 
4. Others mistakenly believed that the hospital would have no challenges 
responding to the disease. For instance, “Edward Goodman, the infec-
tious disease expert at the Dallas hospital, offered assurances that the 
hospital has robust facilities and protocols to handle Ebola.”18 As time 
unfolded, it was also conveyed by David Lakey, the Texas Health Ser-
vices Commissioner, that “the man remains in strict isolation at the 
Dallas hospital, which officials said is equipped to contain and care for 
infectious diseases.”19 However, two nurses were infected while treat-
ing Thomas Duncan. The led Director Frieden to declare that “there 
was a breach in protocol, and that breach in protocol resulted in this 
infection.”20 However, as instructed, “the hospital worker [. . .] wore 
protective gear while treating the Liberian patient. [. . .] The worker 
wore a gown, gloves, a mask and shield while she cared for Duncan.”21 
This led Director Frieden to apologize for his statement about the nurse 
and comment that he felt awful that she had been infected.22 So, it ap-
pears that “the nation’s hospitals may be unprepared to deal with the 
waste caused by Ebola patients.”23 Dr. Macgregor-Skinner states, “We 
Have Admitted Duncan Right Away; ‘Tragic Mistake,’” November 21, 2014, 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2014/11/21/ebola-dr-fauci-of-nih-
says-dallas-hospital-should-have-admitted-duncan-right-away-tragic-mistake/.
16 Robberson, “The Common Link.”
17 “Hospital Official: ‘We Are Deeply Sorry’ for Ebola Mistakes,” NBC  News, 
October 15, 2014, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ebola-virus-outbreak/
hospital-official-we-are-deeply-sorry-ebola-mistakes-n227031/.
18 Schneider, “First U.S. Ebola Case.”
19 Schneider, “First U.S. Ebola Case.”
20 Merchant, “Dallas Health Care Worker.”
21 Merchant, “Dallas Health Care Worker.”
22 John Bacon and Marjorie Owens, “CDC to Change its Approach to Ebola 
Virus,” USA Today, October 14, 2014.
23 Riddell, “After First Ebola Case.”
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have a long way to go—we are nowhere near ready yet.”24
5. Even the federal government overestimated its own understanding and 
capabilities. The White House and CDC stated on many occasions that 
the nation was prepared to deal with Ebola. Nevertheless, a local offi-
cial stated, “The CDC did really not know what was going on.”25 The 
after-action report also revealed that “agencies were receiving conflict-
ing messages from the CDC throughout the event.”26 In addition, had 
this been a broader event, the “DHS may not be able to provide suffi-
cient [. . .] preparedness supplies to its employees to continue opera-
tions during a pandemic.”27 The Inspector General of  the Department 
of  Homeland Security issued a report “warning that the Department 
was woefully prepared for a pandemic, with expired medicines and inad-
equate resources to effectively equip its top responders in the field.”28 
Consequently, one letter to the editor complained “as of  the CDC’s 
public reassurances about the sophistication of  the US medical indus-
try in dealing with the Ebola virus aside, I think it is better to know that 
the CDC and medical system are woefully unprepared than to make 
the dangerous false assumption that they are well-prepared.”29
6. The federal government may have also mistakenly assumed that the 
local and state government capacity and knowledge would be suffi-
cient. However, resources to deal with a crisis such as this are limited. 
For instance, over 45,000 public health positions have been eliminated 
since the 2008 financial crisis.30 There was also insufficient information 
on how to deal with the Ebola incident. Local and state leaders were 
constantly waiting for the federal government to step in with additional 
direction, recommendations, and support. Sgt. Christopher Dyer, who 
was involved in the implementation of  quarantine order, said, “We were 
really looking for the CDC to come in [and] take control of  the situa-
tion.”31 An Assistant City Manager in Dallas said, “We thought the 
24 Riddell, “After First Ebola Case.”
25 Rocky Vaz, interview. May 5, 2015.
26 North Central Texas Council of  Governments. 2015. North Central Texas 
Ebola After-Action Review. April. Arlington, Texas. https://resources.nctcog.org/
ep/News/AprilNewsletter.pdf.
27 Riddell, “After First Ebola Case.”
28 Riddell, “After First Ebola Case.”
29 James D. Beare, “Letter to the Editor.” Dallas Morning News. October 4, 2014.
30 Riddell, “After First Ebola Case.”
31 Bud Kennedy, “Jenkins, Dallas Courthouse Leaders Stepped up after a Slow 
Start,” October 4, 2014, https://www.star-telegram.com/opinion/bud-kennedy/
article3876128.html.
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CDC was actually going to come in and really take the lead and tell us 
what to do. [. . .] The cavalry didn’t come. One expert came for a few 
days, then left, and never came back.32 A Dallas City Emergency Man-
ager commented, “We thought the CDC would get here and there 
would be some medical direction. [. . .] That was not something easily 
or in some cases at all gotten from the CDC. We realized we are not 
getting anything.”33 In spite of  frequent meetings and conference calls, 
Campbell stated that “we felt we were operating blindly. We didn’t have 
the current science. We didn’t have current information.”34
oTher ChallengeS WiTh The reSponSe
In addition to an excessive degree of  confidence on the part of  
some individuals and agencies, there were numerous other problems 
evident in the response. First, the Ebola incident was a public health 
emergency, but there was no legal mechanism to make that declaration 
or structure the response organizationally. The Assistant City Manager 
stated,
It is unique when you talk about something biological be-
cause the county charter basically gives authority to the 
county as the health authority, and there is no seminal struc-
ture for something that is that broad based (like) [. . .] when 
we have disasters. [. . .] There was never a formal emergen-
cy [. . .] as in other disasters when it is manmade or natural.35
A second and related problem was that there was a knowledge and 
communication gap between the emergency management and public 
health communities and the medical communities. Dallas Assistant City 
Manager Eric Campbell noted that “we don’t have the technical health 
expertise we need.”36 Rocky Vaz, the Director of  the Dallas Office of  
Emergency Management, also stated, “We as an EM community have 
to have a better understanding about how the medical community 
works.”37 Along these lines, there were too many delays in communica-
tion. The North Central Texas After-Action Review revealed that the 
32 Eric Campbell (Dallas Assistant City Manager), discussion, interview, 2015.
33 Kevin Oden (Dallas Office of  Emergency Management), in discussion with 
the author, May 5, 2015.
34 Campbell, interview.
35 Campbell, interview.
36 Campbell, interview.
37 Vaz, interview.
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“usual emergency communication structure was not in place because it 
was a “public health” emergency.38 Rocky Vaz reiterated that “I don’t 
have that comfort level to wait for 4 days to call the state. I want to pick 
up the phone and call the state. I want you now.”39 Others agreed. Kev-
in Oden of  the Dallas Office of  Emergency Management stated, “In a 
highly infectious disease situation, we don’t have 16 to 18 hours to wait 
to fig-ure out if  the county is doing what they are supposed to do.”40
A third problem related to confusing media messages. Rocky Vaz 
pointed out that working with the media was challenging. He said, “We 
were telling everyone it is safe and then [in] the next picture frame is our 
people in Hazmat suits going to clean up [the] dog.”41 Eric Campbell 
agreed that the messages were contradictory: “There were images of  
people on TV with PPE and Hazmat protective gear. And we are saying 
it is not a big deal.”42 The North Central Texas After Action Review 
stated that “there were several challenges with managing the media—
the content, accuracy, and timing of  messages.” The After-Action Re-
view also revealed that “authorities had to consult with their legal de-
partment on what and to who information could be released.”43
A fourth problem concerned politics. Whether founded or not, there 
were allegations about racism due to treatment of  Mr. Duncan. John 
Wiley Price, a Dallas County Commissioner at the time, said, “We know 
what happened at Presbyterian happened. It is historical what has hap-
pened in this community. If  a person who looks like me shows up 
without insurance, they don’t get the same treatment.”44 Such politics 
compounded an already difficult situation.
A fifth challenge pertains to quarantines. Public officials had a very 
difficult time determining whether a quarantine would be needed and 
how to implement it. For instance, “officials didn’t immediately guard 
38 North Central Texas, “Ebola After-Action.”
39 Vaz, interview.
40 Oden, discussion.
41 Vaz, interview.
42 Campbell, interview.
43 North Central Texas, “Ebola After-Action.”
44 Matthew Watkins, “John Wiley Price, County Health Director Emphatically 
Defend Dallas Response to the Ebola,” Dallas Morning News, October 7, 2014. 
http://www.ragingelephantsradio.com/john-wiley-price-county-health-direc-
tor-emphatically-defend-dallas-response-to-ebola/.
UVU JoUrnal of national SecUrity14
the apartment to make sure people who were supposed to be isolated 
stayed inside.”45 Rocky Vaz of  the Dallas Office of  Emergency Man-
agement asserted that this quarantine “was just isolation tracking prog-
ress 21 days.”46 Even when this procedure was taken more seriously, 
some of  the nurses refused to be quarantined even though they could 
have been infected themselves. This could have caused the disease to 
spread rapidly and to more individuals, exacerbating an already chal-
lenging occurrence. The dilemma regarding personal freedom and pub-
lic safety needs to be resolved.
A sixth problem relates to fear in terms of  how to interact with 
those who might be infected. People in the community were very con-
cerned that they would be affected by Ebola if  they interacted with the 
victim or his family members. Rocky Vaz noted how the family was 
potentially mistreated after receiving a bungalow from the Catholic Di-
ocese in an isolated area. He said in an interview:
We asked the Red Cross to [. . .] go to Olive Garden and get 
food for the family. The sheriff  set up their command 300 
yards away and they said “we are not getting anywhere near 
there.” So, we had this Red Cross guy with an Olive Garden 
bag. He drove up the long drive, parked his car, put the food 
on the table and one of  the kids opened the door and said 
“hi and thanked him.” They guy took off  and called nation-
al headquarters in D.C. and said the Red Cross is not going 
to feed them anymore. [. . .] They said they would drop it off  
outside the gate about 400 yards away. [. . .] We also called 
the White House and did a no-fly zone over the Dioceses so 
the media could not see where we took them.47
Based on this treatment, the Dallas Emergency Manager believed 
“they were treated like they were [. . .] Lepers. Everyone stared at them 
like they had Ebola.”48
Medical waste, decontamination, debris removal, transportation, and 
disposal were other challenges identified during the response. Several 
individuals commented on this problem:
• Dr. Macgregor-Skinner noted that “Ebola patients create an enormous 
45 Watkins, “John Wiley Price.”
46 Vaz, interview.
47 Vaz, interview.
48 Oden, interview.
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  amount of  waste that is [. . .] highly infectious.”49
• For instance, Atlanta’s Emory University was involved in the treatment 
  of  patients. It was reported that “as many as 40 bags of  waste were gen- 
  erated each day, which placed a huge burden on the hospital’s waste dis- 
  posal system.”50 
• Similar problems were evident at the victim’s residence. The Dallas As- 
  sistant City Manager stated, “We were not sure at all about what level of  
  decontamination was needed. We knew we had to do some level of  
  clean-up, but we didn’t have expert advice.”51 
• Regarding the victim’s home, the Director of  the Office of  Emergency 
  Management stated, “We chopped up everything including the TV. We 
  had 90 barrels. [. . .] It had sheets and clothing and mattresses. It became 
  medical waste. [. . .] It took us 8 hours and 14 city employees to get the 
  house . . . [cleaned].”52 
• Once the medical debris was collected, transporting it became a serious 
  problem. The Dallas Assistant City Manager noted that “you need a spe- 
  cial license to transport HAZMAT waste.”53 Unfortunately, there was 
  disagreement about what type of  license would be needed. Riddell re- 
  ported that “the DOT classifies Ebola as a Category A agent,” but “the 
  CDC, however, [categorizes it] as regulated medical waste.”54
• The OEM Director also mentioned the urgency related to this transpor- 
  tation issue. He said, “We are getting pressure from the mayor because 
  CNN and everybody else is looking around and seeing 90 barrels of  
  medical waste inside. [. . .] So we told the mayor you have to call Secre- 
  tary Fox.”55 The issue was later resolved with the leader of  the US De- 
  partment of  Transportation. 
• Others experienced similar problems. “Conflicting classifications on Eb- 
  ola waste forced the hospital to wait for the US Department of  Trans- 
  portation to issue a special permit before it could move the material.”56
• Once the transportation permits had been obtained, additional problems 
49 Riddell, “After First Ebola Case.”
50 Riddell, “After First Ebola Case.”
51 Campbell, interview.
52 Vaz, interview.
53 Campbell, interview.
54 Riddell, “After First Ebola Case.”
55 Vaz, interview.
56 Sharon Begley, “Ebola Waste Disposal Has Proven a Thorny Issue: CDC,” 
Reuters, October 4, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-ebola-usa-
waste-idUSKCN0HT0P520141004.
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  became evident. According to the Dallas OEM Director, “The city found 
  contractor in Missouri, but it got to a level of  politics where the Gover- 
  nor stepped in and said you are not bringing Ebola waste here. [. . .] Then 
  we found someone in Port Arthur to take it, but they would only take 
  90-gallon barrels. We had 45-gallon barrels. We put the 45-gallon barrels 
  in the 90-gallon barrels [and] transported it with an escort. Then the truck 
  got a flat tire at 2:00 a.m.”57
Such problems with medical waste will need further attention in 
the future.
Finally, dealing with Thomas Duncan’s dog proved problematic. 
The Dallas Office of  Emergency Management “got implicit direction 
[from politicians] that you are not going to get rid of  [put down] the 
dog.”58 However, there was no “playbook” on how this should be done. 
The Assistant City Manager noted that they were “talking to veterinar-
ians across the state and the universities asking [them if  it can be] trans-
mitted to a dog, can a dog transmit it to another human. [They said,] 
“Well, we don’t think so, but I am not going to tell you unequivocally 
that is cannot happen.” [. . .] We even had people come up and say ‘I’ll 
take the dog,’ but you still have the issue of  not knowing how it is trans-
mitted.”59 Eventually, Texas A&M brought a mobile vehicle to the 
house so two vets cleaned the dog and fed it three times a day. The 
Director of  the Dallas Office of  Emergency Manager said “that must 
have cost the state about $200,000 to take care of  the dog.”60
ConCluSion and reCommendaTionS
As can be seen, the Ebola incident in Dallas, Texas, created count-
less challenges for those working in homeland security, emergency 
man-agement, public health, and hospitals. This was in spite of  the fact 
that the incident affected a relatively small number of  people. The 
spread of  the disease was limited to two nurses, and those involved 
should be commended for their tireless efforts to treat patients and 
deal with the multitude of  challenges that were continuously presented. 
However, because a larger outbreak would certainly magnify these chal-
lenges, several lessons must be seriously considered.
57 Vaz, interview.
58 Vaz, interview.
59 Campbell, interview.
60 Vaz, interview.
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First, medical and public officials must have correct assumptions 
about the spread of  Ebola (and other disease outbreaks and bioterror-
ism threats). This includes views about disease transmission, national 
preparedness, treatment protocols, and response capabilities.
Second, increased efforts must be given to build preparedness and 
response efforts in the private sector and at all levels of  government. 
Hospitals must do more to prepare for contagious diseases, and there 
must be further coordination between emergency management and pub-
lic health organizations.
Third, those involved with disease outbreaks and potential bioter-
rorism threats must resolve special concerns, such as communications, 
media messages, politics, quarantines, treatment of  victims, debris man- 
agement, pets, etc.).
Finally, public officials must pay attention more to effective deci-
sion making when disease outbreaks occur. Interviewees noted that 
they were constantly bombarded with limited/changing information 
and complex problems, and they had to make split second decisions 
about how to save lives and react effectively to unfolding concerns.
Should these and other measures be undertaken, the nation will 
ultimately be in a better position to prevent the spread of  diseases and 
react should an unthinkable bio-terrorism attack occur in the future. 
Those involved in national security, homeland security, emergency 
management, and public health can take steps to protect our citizens 
and improve response operations. 
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A. Percy Sherwood
TerroriSm and iTS legal afTermaTh: The limiTS on 
freedom of expreSSion in Canada’S anTi-TerroriSm 
aCT & naTional SeCuriTy aCT
inTroduCTion
On the bright autumn morning of  October 22, 2014, Michael 
Zehaf-Bibeau shot and killed Cpl. Nathan Cirillo at the National War 
Memorial in Ottawa, Canada. Zehaf-Bibeau then entered the parlia-
ment buildings, where he exchanged gunfire with security personnel. 
He was shortly killed by Sergeant-at-Arms Kevin Vickers. In response 
to the shooting, former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper said 
that “extreme jihadists have declared war on us, on all free people, and 
on Canada specifically.”1
Canada introduced the controversial Anti-terrorism Act of  20152 
(commonly known as Bill C-51) in the aftermath of  the shooting; the 
Act created sweeping changes to Canadian security laws. In particular, 
Bill C-51 introduced a speech offense contained in s. 83.221 of  the Crim-
inal Code that made it illegal to communicate statements that advocate 
or promote the commission of  terrorism offenses in general.3 Much of  
1 Stephen Harper, “Archived—PM Announces Anti-Terrorism Measures to 
Protect Canadians” (January 30, 2015): Government of  Canada News Releases, available 
at: <https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2015/01/pm-announces-anti-ter-
rorism-measures-protect-canadians.html>.
2 Bill C-51, An Act to enact the Security of  Canada Information Sharing Act and the 
Secure Air Travel Act, to amend the Criminal Code, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service 
Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and to make related and consequential 
amendments to other Acts, 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2015 cl 20 (assented to 18 June 2015) 
[Bill C-51], available at: <https://www.parl.ca/legisinfo/BillDetails.aspx?bil-
lId=6842344&Language=E>.
3 Bill C-51, supra note 2. Also see: Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 83.221, as 
amended by An Act respecting national security matters, RS 2019, c 59, s 143. The speech 
offense in Bill C-51 provides as follows: “Every person who, by communicating 
statements, knowingly advocates or promotes the commission of  terrorism 
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the scholarship about Bill C-51 has focused on the need for standards 
regarding the collection of  personal information and methods to en-
hance the compliance of  independent review procedures.4 Less atten-
tion has been paid to questions regarding whether the offense infringes 
upon freedom of  expression and, if  it does, whether this restriction on 
speech is legitimate under the Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms.5
This analysis aims to demonstrate how s. 83.221 in Bill C-51 is 
likely to violate freedom of  expression guaranteed under the Charter. 
The first section employs the two-step Irwin Toy6 analysis to show that 
the speech offense infringes upon s. 2(b) of  the Charter. The second 
section uses the Oakes7 test to determine whether the breach of  free-
dom of  expression is a reasonable limit. The Oakes analysis shows that 
(i) preventing terrorist acts from taking place is of  sufficient impor-
tance to warrant overriding freedom of  expression guaranteed under s. 
2(b), and (ii) there is a rational connection between the objective of  the 
prevention of  terrorist acts and the prohibition of  the advocacy and 
promotion of  “terrorism offenses in general.” (iii) However, the speech 
offense does not impair freedom of  expression as little as possible. 
There are existing offenses that prevent terrorism and are more closely 
connected to direct harm and violence; (iv) further, there is not an 
overall proportionality between the effects of  the speech crime and the 
costs to freedom of  expression because of  its chilling effect on speech. 
Section three of  this paper argues that the amendments contained in 
offenses in general—other than an offense under this section—while knowing that 
any of  those offenses will be committed or being reckless as to whether any of  
those offenses may be committed, as a result of  such communication, is guilty of  
an indictable offense and is liable to imprisonment for a term of  not more than 
five years.”
4 Craig Forcese and Kent Roach, False Security: The Radicalization of  Canadian 
Anti-terrorism (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015); Daniel Alati, Domestic Counter-Terrorism in 
a Global World: Post-9/11 Institutional Structures and Cultures in Canada and the United 
Kingdom (London: Routledge, 2017); Michael Geist, Law, Privacy and Surveillance in 
Canada in the Post-Snowden Era ed. (Ottawa: University of  Ottawa Press, 2015).
5 Section 2(b), Part I of  the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. Section 2(b) states that everyone has 
the right to “freedom of  thought, belief, opinion and expression, including 
freedom of  the press and other media of  communication.”
6 Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General), 1989 1 SCR 927 [Irwin Toy].
7 R v Oakes, 1986 1 SCR 103 [Oakes].
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Part 7 of  the National Security Act 8 (also known as Bill C-59) are im-
provements to the speech crime in Bill C-51 because they are more 
likely to satisfy a proportionality test.
i. The IrwIn Toy TeST
1. Is s. 2(b) of  the Charter infringed by the speech crime in Bill C-51?
Canadian courts have interpreted freedom of  expression as defined 
in the Charter quite generally and often easily find a breach.9 Irwin Toy 
provides a two-step analysis used to determine whether there has been 
an infringement upon freedom of  expression. In the first step, Irwin Toy 
establishes that activity is  expressive if  it attempts to convey a mean-
ing.10 The guarantee of  freedom of  expression protects all content of  
expression, except for speech that incites violence and threats of  vio-
lence, as outlined in Irwin Toy.11 Moreover, Chief  Justice Dickson found 
in Keegstra that communications that intend to promote hatred against 
identifiable groups are protected under s. 2(b) unless they are expressed 
in a violent form.12 However, the advocacy and promotion of  terrorism 
offenses in general do not fall within the scope of  direct incitement or 
acts of  violence. For instance, boasting about radical ideologies could 
presumably be considered an offense only if  such speech is directly 
inciting violence against an identifiable group. Section 83.221 thereby 
represents an infringement of  s. 2(b).
2. If  so, does the government’s restriction on it infringe s. 2(b), in purpose or 
effect?
The second step distinguishes between purpose-based and effects- 
based restrictions on expressive activity. Purpose-based restrictions 
control the content of  expression (e.g., hate speech) and effects-based 
restrictions control the physical consequences of  the activity, regardless 
8 Bill C-59, An Act Respecting National Security Matters, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2019 cl 
13 (assented to 21 June 2019) [Bill C-59], available at: <https://www.parl.ca/
legisinfo/BillDetails.aspx?billId=9057418&Language=E.> Also see: Criminal Code, 
RSC 1985, c C-46, s 83.221.
9 Department of  Justice, “Section 2(b)—Freedom of  Expression” (June 17, 
2019): Government of  Canada, available at: <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/
rfc-dlc/ccrf-ccdl/check/art2b.html>.
10 Irwin Toy, supra note 6 at para 42.
11 Irwin Toy at para 43.
12 R v Keegstra, 1990 3 SCR 697 at para 35 [Keegstra].
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of  the content.13 The prohibition in s. 83.221 represents a purpose- 
based restriction on speech in terrorist instruction and participation. 
This restriction therefore prevents the communication of  expression 
and meets the second requirement of  the Irwin Toy test. To summarize, 
the speech crime constitutes an infringement of  the Charter guarantee 
of  freedom of  expression. The next step of  this analysis examines 
whether such an infringement is justifiable under s. 1 of  the Charter as 
a reasonable limit.
ii. The oakes TeST
Oakes has become a central model for how to interpret the Charter, 
particularly in providing for an interpretive methodology to assess jus-
tifiable limitations on Charter rights.14 The case has been cited by courts 
in Australia,15 Ireland,16 South Africa,17 and the United Kingdom,18 which 
suggests that Oakes has gained international significance for constitu-
tional law. In Canada, the four-pronged Oakes test is used to determine 
whether an infringement of  a right is a “reasonable limit” that can be 
“demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society” under s. 1 of  
the Charter.19 This paper applies the Oakes test to the speech offense. 
The speech crime fails at the third and fourth step of  the test: it does 
not minimally impair freedom of  speech as little as possible, nor is there 
proportionality between the prevention of  terrorist acts and the costs 
to free expression.
1. Is the objective of  the measure that limits freedom of  expression “sufficient-
ly important” to warrant the limit?
Parliament’s objective for the security provisions is based on the 
13 Irwin Toy, supra note 6.
14 Sujit Choudhry, “So What Is the Real Legacy of  Oakes? Two Decades of  
Proportionality Analysis under the Canadian Charter’s Section 1” (2006) 34: 19 The 
Supreme Court Law Review at 503.
15 Kartinyeri v The Commonwealth, 1998 HCA 22.
16 Blascaod Mor Teoranta v Commissioners of  Public Works in Ireland, 1998 IEHC 38.
17 S v Singo, 2002 4 SA 858.
18 A v Secretary of  State for the Home Department, 2004 UKHL 56.
19 Charter, supra note 5 at s. 1. Section 1 states, “The Canadian Charter of  Rights 
and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.”
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prevention of  terrorism.20 Khawaja establishes that the prevention of  ter- 
rorism is rooted in the significant harm that acts of  terror can cause.21 
In this context, preventing terrorist acts from taking place is of  suffi-
cient importance to warrant overriding freedom of  expression guaran-
teed under s. 2(b).
2. Is there a “rational connection” between the objective of  the measure that 
limits freedom of  expression and the means chosen to achieve it?
There is a rational connection between the objective of  the preven-
tion of  terrorist acts and the communication of  terrorism offenses in 
general. There is a logical connection between ensuring that individuals 
(e.g., vulnerable youths) are not incited or counselled to commit an act 
of  terrorism through banning such speech. The dissenting opinion in 
Keegstra offers a slightly contrary position. Justice McLachlin, as she was 
then, argues in her dissent that the public may perceive the suppression 
of  expression by the government with suspicion, which allows for the 
possibility that hate propaganda could be seen as containing an element 
of  truth.22 However, an analysis of  ISIS publications shows that its 
communication materials are misleading and sensational, and they con-
tain vast overgeneralizations and inaccuracies.23 These materials are used 
to avoid addressing “the messy nuances of  complex political issues” in 
order to influence and mobilize their audiences.24 It is unlikely that a 
“reasonable person” would see propaganda disseminated by terrorist 
organizations as containing basic truths, nor would such speech con-
tribute to a marketplace of  ideas.
3. Does the measure impair the freedom in question as little as possible?
The speech crime does not impair freedom of  expression as little 
as possible. Several other offenses carry out the governmental objective 
of  preventing terrorism that are more closely connected to direct harm 
20 Department of  Justice, “About the Anti-Terrorism Act” (July 26, 2017): 
Government of  Canada, available at: <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/ns-sn/
act-loi.html>.
21 R v Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69 at para 55 [Khawaja].
22 Keegstra, supra note 12 at para 103.
23 Greg Simons, “Brand ISIS: Interactions of  the Tangible and Intangible 
Environments” (2018) 17: 4 Journal of  Political Marketing at 346.
24 Sarah Sobieraj and Jeffrey M. Berry, “From Incivility to Outrage: Political 
Discourse in Blogs, Talk Radio, and Cable News” (2011) 20: 1 Political Communica-
tion at 20.
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and violence. Dickson writes in Keegstra that section 1 “should not 
operate in every instance so as to force the government to rely upon 
the only mode of  intervention least intrusive to a Charter right or free-
dom.”25 Dickson explains that the government may use a more restric-
tive measure “if  that measure is not redundant, furthering the objective 
in ways that alternative responses could not, and is in all other respects 
proportionate to a valid s. 1 aim.”26 In this respect, introducing the 
advocacy and promotion of  terrorism offenses in general is redundant. 
These offenses already overlap with existing crimes set out in the 2001 
Anti-terrorism Act; they include threatening, instructing, and counsel-
ling terrorist activity.
Moreover, the phrase “terrorism offenses in general” is difficult to 
interpret since it is not defined in Canadian law. It is unclear as to how 
it differs from “terrorist activity,” which already exists in the Criminal 
Code. Unlike the pre-existing crimes, “terrorism offenses in general” does 
not narrowly define crimes that are closely linked to violence and harm. 
For example, an ISIS recruitment video initially posted on YouTube 
features Canadian Andre Poulin saying that people who go to the terri-
tory that his group formerly controlled in Syria “will be very well taken 
care of  here—your families will live here in safety just like back home.”27 
This statement does not directly threaten violence, but it could be cap-
tured under advocating or promoting terrorism offenses in general. An 
individual who reposts or publishes this statement could also possibly 
be charged under the speech offense, which is not closely connected to 
the direct incitement of  violence. The government can pursue its ob-
jective of  preventing acts of  terror through less rights-invasive means 
by using existing offenses such as threats, instruction, or counselling of  
terrorist activity, which are more closely connected to actual violence. 
In this context, the speech crime does not satisfy the minimal impair-
ment test.
4. Is there proportionality—or an overall balance—between the effects of  the 
measure and the objective which has been identified as of  “sufficient importance”?
25 Keegstra, supra note 12 at para 135.
26 Keegstra.
27 Michael Schmidt, “Canadian Killed in Syria Lives On as Pitchman for 
Jihadis” (July 15, 2014): New York Times, available at: <https://www.nytimes.
com/2014/07/16/world/middleeast/isis-uses-andre-poulin-a-canadian-convert-
to-islam-in-recruitment-video.html>.
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The offense has the objective of  preventing terrorist acts. Howev-
er, the effects of  the speech crime disproportionately outweigh the costs 
to freedom of  expression. The chilling effect on speech is immense. In 
particular, the offense could disproportionately affect certain minority 
groups in Canada. McLachlin writes in Khawaja that “police should not 
target people as potential suspects solely because they hold or express 
particular views. Nor should the justice system employ improper ste-
reotyping as a tool in legislation, investigation, or prosecution.”28 Racial 
profiling is significant, considering that existing research about repre-
sentations of  terror shows that Islam and Muslims are regularly associ-
ated with violent extremism and this negative attention is linked to 
increased prejudice against Muslims and Arabs in general.29 The securi-
tization of  Muslims and Arabs in the War on Terror in Canada has also 
resulted in increased national security and police profiling amongst these 
communities.30 This research suggests that the speech offense could 
have a direct chilling effect on Arab and Muslim communities in their 
legitimate exercise of  speech due to the increased scrutiny that these 
marginalized groups face.
Other literature suggests that the speech offense could have coun-
terproductive effects for outreach involving Muslim communities in 
counter-violent extremism (CVE) programs that engage those who have 
deeply felt grievances and may be inclined to use extremist rhetoric.31 
The speech offense could also help drive extremist speech under-
ground, consequently making it difficult for CVE programs and intelli-
gence agencies to detect.32 The effects of  the speech crime designed to 
28 Khawaja, supra note 21 at para 83.
29 Henrik Andersen and Jochen Mayerl, “Attitudes Towards Muslims and Fear 
of  Terrorism” (2018) 41: 15 Ethnic and Racial Studies; Keon West and Joda Lloyd, 
“The Role of  Labeling and Bias in the Portrayals of  Acts of  ‘Terrorism’: Media 
Representations of  Muslims vs. Non-Muslims” (2017) 37: 2 Journal of  Muslim 
Minority Affairs; Mahmoud Eid and Karim H. Karim, eds, Re-imagining the Other: 
Culture, Media, and Western–Muslim Intersections (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2014).
30 Amanda L. Smith and Susan E. Mason, “The Age of  Racial Profiling in the 
Context of  Terrorism” (2016) 21: 2 Modern Psychological Studies; Uzma Jamil, “The 
War on Terror in Canada: Securitizing Muslims” (2016) 1: 2 Journal of  Islamic and 
Muslim Studies; Wayne Hanniman, “Canadian Muslims, Islamophobia and National 
Security” (2008) 36: 4 International Journal of  Law, Crime and Justice.
31 Forcese and Roach, False Security, supra note 4 at 314.
32 Forcese and Roach.
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promote Parliament’s objective thereby do not outweigh the costs to 
freedom of  expression.
iii. amendmenTS in Bill C-59
The Part 7 of  Bill C-59 amends the crime of  advocating or pro-
moting the commission of  terrorism offenses in general into a “coun-
selling” offense.33 Canada’s Privacy Commissioner told the Senate that 
this law is “fairly balanced and clearly an improvement.”34 Indeed, the 
“counselling” offense is more likely to satisfy a proportionality test. This 
investigation finds that speech that does not directly threaten violence 
or harm could be captured under the speech crime. In addition, radical 
boasting would not likely be captured in the amendments because these 
statements do not directly incite violence against an identifiable group. 
For example, the statement made by Poulin that people “will be very 
well taken care of ” in now-former ISIS-controlled territory advances 
an extreme argument, but it does not directly threaten violence. De-
spite it being a disreputable claim, the listener is left to decide whether 
the claim has merit.
This analysis also finds that the effects of  the existing speech crime 
do not outweigh the costs to freedom of  expression due to the possible 
chilling effect on Arab and Muslim communities. McLachlin raises a 
relevant argument in Keegstra that “theories of  a grand conspiracy be-
tween government and elements of  society wrongly perceived to be 
malevolent can become all too appealing if  government dignifies them 
by completely suppressing their utterance.”35 A free and democratic 
society certainly should not criminalize unfavorable ideas. The amend-
ments reduce the chilling effect for those holding deep grievances with 
the state by allowing those individuals to engage in discussion if  they 
33 Bill C-59, supra note 8; Criminal Code, supra note 8 at s. 83.221. Section 83.221 
of  the Criminal Code states “Every person who counsels another person to commit 
a terrorism offense without identifying a specific terrorism offense is guilty of  an 
indictable offense and is liable to imprisonment for a term of  not more than five 
years.”
34 Daniel Therrien, “Appearance before the Senate Standing Committee on 
National Security and Defence (SECD) on C-59, An Act Respecting National Security 
Matters” (April 29, 2019): Privacy Commissioner of  Canada, available at: <https://
www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/advice-to-parliament/2019/
parl_20190429/>.
35 Keegstra, supra note 12.
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are not directly inciting violence.
Finally, the amendments improve way they convert the concepts of  
advocacy and promotion into the existing offense of  counselling others 
to commit a terrorism offense. Counselling or inciting others to carry 
out an act of  terrorism is traditionally understood to be a crime and is 
an established concept in the Criminal Code.36 The concepts of  advocacy 
and promotion of  terrorism offenses in general are exceptionally vague 
in how they set out to further Parliament’s objective in ways that coun-
selling, instructing, and threatening terrorist activity cannot.37 The new 
Bill removes the offense of  advocating or promoting terrorism offens-
es in general and replaces it with a counselling offense.38
ConCluSion
One of  the dangers of  enacting legislation in the aftermath of  ter- 
rorism events is overreacting to the threat. Bill C-51, including its broad 
speech offense, is indicative of  such a forcible response. The Act pres-
ents a serious challenge to the established rights and freedoms of  
Canadians.39 This heavy-handed approach to security echoes the emer-
gency use of  the now-repealed War Measures Act of  1914 during the 
1970 kidnapping of  the British trade commissioner in Montreal, a past 
overreaction to the threat of  terrorism that unduly compromised fun-
damental freedoms.40
Of  the problematic elements of  Bill C-51, this investigation has 
shown how the speech crime contained in this Act is likely to violate 
36 Craig Forcese and Kent Roach, “A Report Card on the National Security 
Bill” (June 22, 2017): Institute for Research on Public Policy.
37 The Canadian Civil Liberties Association has stated that Bill C-59’s counsel-
ling offense includes a “clearer and more appropriate legal structure surrounding 
them, and this change limits the risk of  uncertainty, overbreadth, or a chilling 
effect on protected speech.” Canadian Civil Liberties Association, “The Terrorist 
Speech Offense and Bill C-59” (September 12, 2017): Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association, available at: <https://ccla.org/terrorist-speech-bill-c-59/>.
38 Criminal Code, supra note 8 at s 83.221.
39 Forcese and Roach, False Security supra note 4 at viii.
40 Forcese and Roach, at 30–31. The now-repealed War Measures Act provided 
for emergency measures in wartime. As Forcese and Roach argue, the War Measures 
Act “authorized the warrantless arrest of  those who police had ‘reason to suspect’ 
where members of  any unlawful association.” Like Bill C-51’s terrorism speech 
crime, the War Measures Act speech crime was “an indictable offense subject to five 
years imprisonment” (30–31).
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s. 2(b) of  the Charter. The two-step Irwin Toy test shows that the speech 
offense violates freedom of  expression. On whether the speech offense 
can be justified under s. 1 of  the Charter as a reasonable limit, the legis-
lation fails at the third and fourth step of  the Oakes test. On step three, 
the speech offense does not impair freedom of  expression as little as 
possible because statements that do not directly threaten violence or 
harm are likely to be captured. On step four, the effects of  the speech 
crime also disproportionately outweigh the costs to freedom of  expres-
sion because the speech offense has a chilling effect, specifically on Arab 
and Muslim communities. The amendments to the speech crime in Bill 
C-59 are improvements over the speech crime contained in Bill C-51 as 
they convert the concepts of  advocacy and promotion into the existing 
offense of  counselling others, which is an established concept in the 
Criminal Code. The revised speech offense in Bill C-59 clarifies these 
overly broad concepts and, in doing so, adequately addresses the one 
of  many constitutional flaws in Bill C-51.
Nicole Nielsen
China’S impaCT on uS naTional SeCuriTy
inTroduCTion 
China and Africa have been long-time diplomatic partners,1 but 
recently, these relations have explored new heights.2 The changes have 
taken place across many sectors: humanitarian aid, trade, personnel train- 
ing, student exchanges, even military. According to the Council on Foreign 
Relations, “China has participated in energy, mining, and telecommuni-
cations industries and financed the construction of  roads, railways, ports, 
airports, hospitals, schools, and stadiums.”3 Additionally, Chinese funds‚ 
both private and state, have been put towards tobacco, sugar, sisal, and 
rubber plantations.4 While many see China’s providing funding as a 
positive action—helping a continent that has long been the epitome of  
poverty and the third world—there are strong negative ramifications. 
Not only does it cripple Africa and stunt its economic growth,5 it also 
impacts United States national security. Many in Africa believe China’s 
aid is done out of  the goodness of  its heart. Larry Hanauer and Lyle 
Morris of  RAND Corporation, a global policy nonprofit, note in their 
article China in Africa: Implications of  a Deepening Relationship, “Many 
1 Larry Hanaur and Lyle J. Morris, “China in Africa: Implications of  a Deepen-
ing Relationship,” RAND Corporation, 2014, https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_briefs/RB9760.html.
2 David H. Shinn, “China’s Economic Impact on Africa,” Oxford Research 
Encyclopedia of  Politics, Oxford University Press, March 20, 2019, https://
oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/
acrefore-9780190228637-e-831.
3 Eleanor Albert, “China in Africa,” Council on Foreign Relations, July, 12, 
2017, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-africa.
4 Deborah Brautigam, Will Africa Feed China? (Oxford University Press, 2015), 8.
5 Shinn, “China’s Economic Impact on Africa.”
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African leaders believe that as a fellow developing country, China has 
more altruistic motives than Western governments and corporations 
do.”6 While this may be the perspective among many leaders through-
out the region, it can be argued that China’s relationship with Africa has 
many negative side effects that not only impact the African countries, 
but also US national security. The effects on US national security are 
demonstrated by the growth of  the Chinese economy through its rela-
tions with Africa. The negative impacts can also be seen in Africa’s 
increased dependence on China and the increase in corruption in many 
of  the governments throughout all of  Africa.
The diversity of  the countries across the continent of  Africa should 
be noted. From South Africa to Egypt to Mali to Chad, each country 
has its own set of  natural resources, its own terrain, its own people, 
unique to each country. It does not do the countries or continent jus-
tice to clump them all under one label of  “Africa.” However, for pur-
poses of  this paper, Africa will refer to the entire continent as a whole, 
as China’s relations have had affect across the giant land mass.
China’S eConomy
The economic growth China has experienced through its relations 
with Africa are a concern for US national security. China’s relations and 
partnership with various African countries have been hugely stimulat-
ing to the Chinese economy, as “trade between Africa and China has 
grown at a breathtaking pace. It was $10.5 billion in 2000, $40 billion in 
2005 and $166 billion in 2011. China is currently Africa’s largest trading 
partner, having surpassed the US in 2009.”7 The United Nations’ mag-
azine, African Renewal, published an article called “China in the Heart of  
Africa,” which shows the impact on China’s economy. It states, “In an 
article in This Is Africa, a Financial Times publication, Sven Grimm and 
Daouda Cissé state that in recent years China’s economy at times has 
grown at more than 10 percent a year.”8 This partnership has been very 
beneficial for China, increasing its economic power. With increased 
Chinese economic power comes a stronger threat to the United States. 
Without the power of  economy, China would not be a force with which 
6 Hanaur and Morris, “China in Africa.”
7 Kingsley Ighobor, “China in the Heart of  Africa,” Africa Renewal, January 2013, 
https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/january-2013/china-heart-africa.
8 Ighobor, “China in the Heart of  Africa.” 
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to be reckoned. These quotes, however, show that its economy is boom-
ing and should be taken seriously. A strong economy gives China the 
power to carry out potential national security threats.
It is well known that China’s behavior has been increasingly provoc-
ative to the United States. Some examples of  such behavior are the 
building of  artificial islands in the South China Sea, increasing its naval 
and military capacity, and constructing additional battleships, etc.9 All 
of  this is expensive, and the economic benefits China gains from rela-
tions and trade with Africa help to fund these actions. These actions are 
a threat to many countries, including the United States and other South-
eastern Asian countries; they allow China to continue to build threats 
and potentially carry out more aggressive actions.
Another problem this poses for the United States is the lack of  
entry into African markets. China passed the United States as Africa’s 
number one trade partner. In an article titled “Why Africa Matters to 
U.S. National Security,” Grant Harris states the: “In the long run, the 
strength of  the U.S. economy will, in some way, depend on the interest 
and capacity of  American businesses to operate in Africa, as well as 
the willingness of  African consumers to purchase American goods 
and services.”10 He also notes that “other countries—and particularly 
China—are outpacing the United States, seizing economic opportuni-
ties that could otherwise be contributing to U.S. growth and jobs.”11 The 
countries within Africa are vital to the progression of  the US economy. 
Without building the partnerships on the continent and increasing trade, 
the United States will be lagging behind, as China continues to grow 
economically and further its political influence. 
afriCa’S inCreaSing dependenCe on China
With the immense amount of  aid that has been given to countries 
on the African continent, many nations have become very reliant on 
China. This, as has been noted, stifles Africa’s ability to grow and to 
develop. It also spreads Chinese interests and mentality throughout the 
9 Shen Dingli et al., “China’s Maritime Disputes,” Council on Foreign Relations, 
Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/interactives/chinas-maritime-dis-
putes?cid=otr-marketing_use-china_sea_InfoGuide.
10 Grant T. Harris, “Why Africa Matters to US National Security,” Atlantic 
Council, May 2017, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/05/Why_Africa_Matters_to_US_National_Security_0524_web.pdf.
11 Harris, “Why Africa Matters to US National Security.”
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entire continent. Examples of  the spread of  influence are noted in the 
Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of  the People’s Republic of  China’s article, 
“China–Africa Relations,” which states, “Continuing to grant scholar-
ships to African students every year to study in China, the Chinese 
government hosted various study and training courses to help African 
countries forming professional contingents.”12 These classes include “the 
classes of  advanced-studies for both Chinese and African management 
personnel and the training courses for young and mid-aged African 
diplomats.”13 The article continues,
China also organized study-tours for high-ranking African 
diplomats to visit China and exchange experiences. China 
announced to establish an African Human Resources De-
velopment Fund during the Forum on China-Africa Coop-
eration—Miniserial Conference 2000 to help African coun-
tries train more professionals of  different disciplines.14
China is taking drastic measures to build a dependent relationship 
with African countries. Some may think this is done out of  China’s 
good will, as China calls its approach to this partnership “no strings 
attached.” This implies the aid given requires no quid pro quo; nothing is 
demanded in return. It can be argued, however, that there are other 
motives and expectations behind it. China is making these countries 
dependent on China, which gives China power and leverage, allowing 
China to advance its objectives. Typically, these objectives are in con-
flict with United States’ interests.
Some African people have recognized these ulterior motives and 
noticed the impact on their people. They have protested Sino–African 
relations and how involved China has been with African affairs. Morris 
and Hanauer of  RAND Corporation state,
Some in Africa, however, are critical of  Chinese engagement. 
Labor unions, civil society groups, and other segments of  
African societies criticize Chinese enterprises for poor labor 
conditions, unsustainable environmental practices, and job 
displacement. In their view, China perpetuates a neo-colo-
nial relationship. . . . In some countries, resentment at Chi-
12 “China–Africa Relations,” Accessed June 18, 2019, http://www.fmprc.gov.
cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/tl8059.shtml.
13 “China–Africa Relations.”
14 “China–Africa Relations.”
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nese business practices has led to popular protests and vio-
lence against Chinese businessmen and migrants.15
As an attempt to improve China’s image with disgruntled Africans, 
“Beijing has adjusted its policies to assuage Africans’ concerns and put 
the Sino–African relationship on a more balanced footing. These mod-
ifications include . . . the promotion of  Chinese soft power, culture, and 
people-to-people exchanges.”16 These alternative methods do not ad-
dress the people’s concerns and protests. Hanauer and Morris state that 
these modifications are ways to improve relations with the African peo-
ple. On the contrary, these adjustments are merely ways to increase 
Chinese influence and way of  thinking on the African continent.
The spread of  a Chinese way of  thinking and Africa’s dependence 
on China are harmful to US national security; they pose the threat of  
communism spreading. It can almost be viewed as China doing the 
same thing as the United States did after World War II: The Marshall 
Plan. The United States aided Europe and built up weak countries to 
look more like the US, to prevent the spread of  communism and to aid 
in the spread of  democracy. The works of  China in Africa can be seen 
as the same thing, only in reverse. The Chinese version of  the Marshall 
Plan is being furthered by taking over the news in Africa. Kingsley Ig-
hobor from African Renewal explains, 
Xinhua, China’s state-run news agency, has increased its bu-
reaus in Africa to more than 20. Yu-Shan Wu, a researcher 
at the South African Institute of  International Affairs, sees 
a broader motive. “China is actively introducing its culture 
and values,” she says, and calls the push “the rise of  China’s 
state-led media dynasty in Africa.”17 
Knowing China is infringing on African news should be concern-
ing to many, as it is clear China is trying to control the message being 
conveyed to the public.
The impact of  China’s infringement on African news can already be 
seen in Africa’s support of  Chinese policies. According to the Ministry 
of  Foreign Affairs of  the People’s Republic of  China, “African coun-
tries firmly support China in its endeavor for national unification. And 
15 Hanaur and Morris, “China in Africa.”
16 Hanaur and Morris, “China in Africa.”
17 Ighobor, “China in the Heart of  Africa.”
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most of  them support China’s “one China” policy.”18 Furthering this 
point, in an article “China in Africa by Council on Foreign Relations,” 
Eleanor Albert states, “Experts from Aid Data, a research lab at the 
College of  William & Mary, found a link between Chinese assistance 
and the alignment of  recipient countries with Beijing’s UN voting and 
its One China principle.”19 This policy expands China’s power and ter-
ritory, acknowledging that Taiwan is a part of  mainland China. While 
the United States recognizes the One China policy, it also acknowledg-
es Taiwan and has informal relations with it, limiting China’s power.20 
African countries that have received Chinese aid recognize China as 
the sole power and Chinese government, which contributes to Chinese 
expansion. The support of  Chinese policies continues because of  the 
dependence Africa has on China.
Additionally, Africa’s dependence on China grows with the many 
generous loans China has given to many African countries. African debt 
to China is increasing, again, allowing China power over these countries. 
David Shinn, former US ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia, 
writes in Oxford’s Research Encyclopedia, “African governments wel-
come Chinese loans, which are usually used for infrastructure projects, 
but there are signs these loans are contributing to a debt problem in an 
increasing number of  countries.”21 This debt and feeling of  obligated 
loyalty increases with donations and assistance described in the United 
Nations’ magazine African Renewal: 
China had either donated or assisted in building a hospital 
in Luanda, Angola; a road from Lusaka, Zambia’s capital, to 
Chirundu in the southeast; stadiums in Sierra Leone and 
Benin; a sugar mill and a sugarcane farm in Mali; and a wa-
ter supply project in Mauritania, among other projects. At 
the fifth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, held in Bei-
jing in July 2012, Chinese President Hu Jintao listed yet 
more, including 100 schools, 30 hospitals, 30 anti-malaria 
centres and 20 agricultural technology demonstration cen-
tres.22 
18 “China–Africa Relations.” 
19 Albert, “China in Africa.”
20 “What Is the ‘One China’ Policy?”
21 Shinn, “China’s Economic Impact on Africa.”
22 Ighobor, “China in the Heart of  Africa.” 
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Clearly, China is leaving its mark on the countries of  Africa by con- 
trolling the media and creating African dependence. This is damaging 
the African economy in that it is not self-sufficient and “saddled with 
giant piles of  debt.”23 Without China, Africa’s economy has potential 
for an extreme crash, as it has “alienate[d] people who were willing to 
help”24 with such high reliance on the Chinese help. Some leaders in 
African governments are recognizing this and calling for change. Afri-
can Renewal makes the point that catastrophe is looming as dependence 
increases, “South African President Jacob Zuma warned in July that the 
current ‘unbalanced’ trade pattern is unsustainable.”25 This is a justified 
fear. This lopsided partnership cannot continue forever. As Africa’s re-
liance and debt to China is racking up, a crash seems inevitable. 
The situation is problematic for the United States. As China in-
creases its power over these countries and maintains leverage over 
them, the African countries are at the mercy of  the Chinese govern-
ment. This progresses Chinese objectives, which hinders those of  the 
United States. As African debt increases, so does the risk of  an eco-
nomic collapse. With a crippled economy, this would leave plenty of  
room for anarchy, corruption, and violence, as will be discussed further 
in the following section.
CorrupT goVernmenTS 
The corruption of  many governments in Africa is no secret to the 
international world, as is noted in the Council of  Foreign Relations arti-
cle, “Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in which Stephanie Hanson 
notes, “Africa is widely considered among the world’s most corrupt plac-
es, a factor seen as contributing to the stunted development and impov-
erishment of  many African states. Of  the ten countries considered most 
corrupt in the world, six are in sub-Saharan Africa.”26 Adding to the 
discussion of  a crippled African economy, according to BBC Africa 
analyst, Elizabeth Blunt, corruption costs the continent roughly $150 
23 Lydia Polgreen, “As Chinese Investment in China Drops, Hope Sinks,” The 
New York Times, March 25, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/world/
africa/26chinaafrica.html?_r=1. 
24 Polgreen, “As Chinese Investment in China Drops, Hope Sinks.”
25 Ighobor, “China in the Heart of  Africa.”
26 Stephanie Hanson, “Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Council on Foreign 
Relations, August 6, 2009, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/corruption-sub-sa-
haran-africa.
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billion a year.27 This corruption is seen by African leaders making deals 
for their own benefit, keeping money and profit for themselves, perpe-
trating human rights violations, and doing other inappropriate and unac-
ceptable behaviors. Again, from the Council of  Foreign Relations’ article 
“China in Africa,” Albert says, “China’s activity in Africa has faced criti-
cism from Western and African civil society over its controversial busi-
ness practices, as well as its failure to promote good governance and 
human rights.”28 Relations with other countries, including the United 
States, are limited because of  actions by leaders and governments. China, 
however, does not hold its allies or partners to the same standard.
The West African country of  Guinea-Bissau has a perfect example 
of  a corrupt government. Having personally been to this country, I 
have witnessed this corruption firsthand and how China influences it. 
In a personal interview I had with a native to Guinea-Bissau and a local 
activist, Macote Ambrozio, he described the impact China has on his 
home country. He’s experienced the inequality created by his corrupt 
government. He states that government leaders make deals with China 
to export much of  its cashew plant and mangos. The Chinese pay the 
government officials for access to these resources at a very low cost to 
China, and the money is paid directly to the government officials in-
stead of  to the country. China then sells them internationally and makes 
all the money from Guinea-Bissau’s resources.29 Guinea-Bissau is not 
the only corrupt government that is gaining from Chinese partnerships. 
Transparency International explained, “Several Chinese companies, in-
cluding the Chinese Energy Fund Committee, the telecommunications 
firm ZTE and the China Roads and Bridge Construction Company, 
have been accused of  bribing senior government officials in Chad and 
Uganda, Zambia and Kenya.”30 China’s partnership with Africa cripples 
the African economy through corrupt governments.
Of  the many obvious problems with corrupt governments, one 
of  the biggest currently affecting Africa is that of  stunted economies. 
China aids in this by preventing growth to many industries on the 
27 Elizabeth Blunt, “Corruption Costs Africa billions,” BBC News, September 
18, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2265387.stm.
28 Albert, “China in Africa.” 
29 Macote Ambrozio, Personal Interview with the author, June 1, 2019. 
30 “Where Are Africa’s Billions?” Transparency International, July 19, 2019, 
http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/where_are_africas_billions.
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continent. As stated in Oxford’s Research Encyclopedia, “The influx 
of  inexpensive Chinese products is also stifling Africa’s ability to pro-
duce similar goods.”31 The efforts of  China, its loans, and the products 
it is introducing to African markets are causing local job displacement 
and costing natives their livelihood.32
Corrupt African governments want to engage in relations with 
China specifically for personal strategic reasons, but not for the people 
of  the country. According to Hanauer and Morris, “Good-governance 
watchdogs warn that China negotiates unfair deals that take advantage 
of  African governments’ relative weaknesses and that foster corrup-
tion.”33 The deals made by China with African governments allow for 
the perpetuation of  corruption. Hanauer and Morris continue,
To some degree, many African leaders hope that China will 
interact with them in ways that the United States and other 
Western governments do not—by engaging economically 
without condescendingly preaching about good governance, 
for example, or by investing in high-risk projects or in re-
mote regions that are not appealing to Western governments 
or companies.34
The leaders get all the “benefits” from China’s partnership without 
any demand for improving or overcoming corruption, which clearly 
poses a threat to United States national security. China is allowing Africa 
to perpetuate mistreatment of  its people and human rights violations. 
China allows the leaders of  governments to continue to seek gain for 
themselves while causing their people to suffer in poverty and hunger. 
Building such relations with the United States and other countries would 
requ]ire Africa to respect human rights and uphold the democratic pro-
cess. This would strengthen US national security and form more alli-
ances for the United States, giving access to strategic locations on the 
African continent, while also improving conditions and treatment of  
the African people and disposing of  corrupt governments.
Another danger to corrupt governments is the inability to lead, 
which leaves room for terrorism to breed. Charles B. Holmes, co-direc-
tor of  the Center for Global Health and Quality and visiting associate 
31 Shinn, “China’s Economic Impact on Africa.”
32 Hanaur and Morris, “China in Africa.”
33 Hanaur and Morris, “China in Africa.”
34 Hanaur and Morris, “China in Africa.”
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professor of  medicine at Georgetown University, discusses this issue: 
“Africa is home to several states teetering on a fragile edge, with unsta-
ble political, economic, and security conditions characterizing much of  
the Sahel region, including Mali, Chad, South Sudan, and the Central 
African Republic. These countries are increasingly home to terrorist cells 
linked to Al-Qaeda and other networks.”35 Of  course, as China fosters 
this kind of  corruption, terrorism continues to grow, which expands the 
ongoing terrorist threat to United States national security. Such terror-
ist groups have targeted the United States several times before. Grant 
Harris states, “African-based groups such as Boko Haram—the second 
most lethal terrorist group in the world—and al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) espouse dangerous anti-American and/or anti-West-
ern ideologies.”36
Though there are some that say the Sino–African relationship pos-
es no threat to the United States, these terrorist groups are one example 
that proves them wrong. The Chinese continue to support corrupt 
African governments, decreasing their ability to govern, leaving plenty 
of  space for dangerous terrorist groups. This is a serious threat to not 
just the United States, but the rest of  the world, as well.
ConCluSion
Some acknowledge the China–African relationship as a zero-sum 
relationship and a problem for US national security. Still, others claim 
this partnership benefits all involved and that there is no effect on the 
United States, a position Hanauer and Morris support: “While China’s 
‘no strings attached’ approach may foster inefficient decision making 
and official corruption, Chinese engagement does not fundamentally 
undermine U.S. economic and political goals on the continent.”37 Their 
argument is
Chinese-built infrastructure helps reduce businesses’ oper-
ating costs and expand the size of  regional markets, increas-
ing opportunities for profitable ventures by indigenous and 
35 Charles B. Holmes, “Why Africa Matters to the United States and How 
President Donald Trump’s New Africa Strategy Falls Short,” Health Affairs Blog, 
March 8, 2019, https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377hblog20190306.413630/
full/.
36 Harris, “Why Africa Matters to US National Security.”
37 Hanaur and Morris, “China in Africa.” 
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U.S. investors. U.S. and Chinese approaches and interests do 
not inherently contradict each other, and U.S. officials, in-
cluding Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, have 
denied that Washington and Beijing are engaged in a “zero 
sum” competition for influence and access in Africa.38 
While it is true there are some benefits of  the Sino–African rela-
tionship to African countries, it is not true that the United States is left 
unaffected. As has been stated throughout this paper, the growth to 
China’s economy through African partnerships threatens US national 
security. It allows China to continue to build its military and disrupt the 
South China Sea. This partnership also increases Africa’s dependence 
on China, leaving these countries at the mercy of  China. This increases 
China’s power, allowing it to spread communism and Chinese objectives. 
Lastly, the Sino–African relationship fosters corruption and breeds ter-
rorism. For obvious reasons, this is dangerous to many parts of  the 
world, especially the United States and its allies, as they are often targets 
of  terrorism. 
Because of  these very real and prevalent risks to the United States, 
it is necessary to start acting against the negative aspects of  Sino–Afri-
can relations. Africa is too big a player to leave for China to control. 
Again, from Holmes makes a crucial point, “How Africa grows and 
evolves today will not only shape the future of  the African continent, it 
will also shape the future of  the world.”39 If  the United States steps in 
too late, these African countries will have already chosen the Chinese 
side, posing a huge threat to US national security. Ignoring the potential 
harm of  the Sino–African relationship could prove catastrophic for the 
United States of  America.
38 Hanaur and Morris, “China in Africa: Implications of  a Deepening Relation-
ship.”
39 Holmes, “Why Africa Matters To The United States And How President 
Donald Trump’s New Africa Strategy Falls Short.”
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Brandon Amacher
Command VerSuS CommerCe: Comparing and 
analyzing The poST-World War ii eConomieS  
of eaSTern and WeSTern europe
The second World War was one of  the greatest man-made ca-
tastrophes in human history. The conflict wrought a truly unprecedent-
ed level of  both physical and economic destruction across the Europe-
an continent. After the war, the nations of  Europe were faced with the 
daunting challenge of  rising from the ashes and attempting to rebuild 
their once-strong economies. The people of  Europe were desperate 
for relief, and theories and opinions on how to do provide them succor 
varied immensely. The once widely accepted ideology of  free market 
economics faced a serious threat in the form of  growing support for 
the command economic systems of  socialism and communism. While 
these ideas were not new, they now posed a more imminent threat. 
Marxist ideologies had gained significant support in the early twentieth 
century, even to the point of  being adopted in some eastern parts of  
Europe, most notably in the Soviet Union. These distinct ideologies not 
only differed from the status-quo free markets of  the west in thought, 
but also in the outcomes they produced. The respective economic re-
coveries of  the capitalist nations of  Western Europe and those under 
communism in Eastern Europe provide a significant case study as to 
the effectiveness of  the policies and ideologies that determined their 
disparate courses. This paper will undertake to prove that the use of  
market economies and free trade in Western Europe were the primary 
reasons for its superior post-WWII recovery when compared to the 
command economies of  Eastern Europe. This will be done by analyz-
ing the extent of  economic destruction following the war, investigating 
and analyzing the differences in recovery policies in the East and the 
Weat, particularly the Marshall Plan, and analyzing the respective de-
grees of  success in the two regions.
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To understand the recoveries of  the nations of  Europe clearly, the 
extent of  the economic devastation it experienced during the war must 
first be understood. Before the war, some of  the most powerful econ-
omies in the world resided in the Western part of  the continent. For 
centuries, the colonial empires of  Great Britain and France had essen-
tially ruled the world. This prosperous past, however, was not enough 
to shield them from the devastation of  World War II.
Before the war, the economy of  France was among the strongest 
on Earth. In 1939, the year the war broke out, France boasted a Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of  199 billion dollars (at 1990 price level) 
with a GDP per capita of  $4,424. For reference, this per capita number 
was about 72% of  the per capita GDP of  the United States at the time. 
Following the war, France’s economic output had decreased by almost 
50 percent, with GDP falling to only 101 billion dollars in 1945. Also, 
France’s new GDP per capita in 1950 represented only 55 percent of  
the value of  the GDP per capita of  the United States at the same time.1 
To put this into perspective, an economic loss of  this scale would be 
comparable to the modern-day United States losing the combined eco-
nomic output of  California, Texas, New York, Florida, Pennsylvania, 
Illinois, and Ohio.2
Britain also experienced economic strife as a result of  the war but 
not to the same extent that France did. This disparity can be partially 
attributed to the fact that, with the exception of  bombings, no battles 
were fought in mainland Britain. Nevertheless, Britain’s economy was 
hit hard by the conflict. In 1939, the British economy boasted a GDP 
of  about 300 thousand Geary-Khamis Dollars (GK). Following the 
war, the GDP of  Britain had increased to 327 thousand GK in 1947.3 
These numbers may seem to constitute a positive change due to the 
fact that the economy continued to grow; however, when compared to 
past performance, it is clear that these numbers represent a significant 
1 Mark Harrison, The Economics of  World War II: Six Great Powers in International 
Comparison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 3-8, 10, 34.
2 Regional Data: GDP and Personal Income [US GDP 2018= 18566442 
Million USD. Combined output of  listed States=9287696.2 Million USD. 
(9287696.2 Million/18566442 Million)x100=50.02% of  national GDP].
3 Angus Maddison, “Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 
1-2008 AD” (XLS), online supplement to Historical Statistics of  the World Economy 
1-2008 AD, (Groningen: University of  Groningen, 2018) http://www.ggdc.net/
maddison/oriindex.htm.
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downturn in the British economy. Over this period the GDP growth 
rate of  Britain was only around 1.5% annually whereas over the previ-
ous eight years the economy had grown at a rate of  3.75% annually.4 
This data constitutes a significant downturn in British economic prow-
ess. These numbers are even more staggering when compared to the 
United States, another combatant that did not experience conflict on 
their home soil, whose economy grew at an average of  7.2% annually 
over the same period.5 Despite their economy not shrinking, this signif-
icant decrease in growth illustrates just how devastated the island na-
tion was despite not experiencing a ground invasion.
Nations in the eastern part of  Europe were no better off  than their 
western counterparts. Economic data from Eastern Europe in the early 
twentieth century is scarce, and information regarding some major na-
tions, like Poland, is not readily available or not very reliable. The data 
for the nations with statistics available, however, tells a horrific tale. In 
1939 Bulgaria had a GDP of  about $10.6 billion. By the end of  the war 
in 1945, the nation’s GDP had dropped to only $7.5 billion.6 In other 
words, during the war, thirty percent of  the nation’s economy had simply 
vanished. Hungary had also been ravaged by the war, seeing their GDP 
drop from about $26 billion in 1939 to $15.6 billion in 1946.7 Hungary 
had lost an even greater portion of  their economy to the war ,with over 
40% of  their output having been utterly destroyed.
The once-robust economies of  Europe were in shambles. The threat 
of  Fascist invasion may have passed, but new threats of  hyperinflation, 
massive debt, decimated infrastructures, and fiscal uncertainties now 
oc-cupied nearly the entirety of  the continent. The region had to start 
the long and painful process of  rebuilding, and ideas varied widely on 
what economic systems and practices would best alleviate the suffering 
of  the people of  Europe. One of  the prevailing ideologies relied heav-
ily on the free market economic philosophy of  Adam Smith. This phi-
losophy had been the predominant system of  many European nations 
for some time, and its ideology essentially posits that free markets will 
typically self-regulate and achieve allocative and productive efficiency 
through free trade of  goods and private property ownership. The 
4 Maddison, “Statistics on World Population.”
5 Maddison, “Statistics on World Population.”
6 Maddison, “Statistics on World Population.”
7 Maddison, “Statistics on World Population.”
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theory of  free-market capitalism is based on the idea that people are 
rational and self-interested; it further assumes that typically when peo-
ple act upon these motivations, total societal well-being increases. On 
the other side of  the argument, the followers of  Karl Marx’s commu-
nist and socialist ideologies believed that capitalism inherently led to 
the oppression of  the working class and an unacceptable level of  in-
equality in society. Under a communist system, private property does 
not exist, and the government is the sole decision-making body when it 
comes to the regulation of  the economy and interactions. The govern-
ment decides the quantity of  goods produced and the amount of  goods 
allotted to each individual in society.
During the first part of  the twentieth century, contingents of  these 
two ideologies existed in nearly all European nations. Both traditional 
capitalist and communist parties had followers and competed for seats 
in legislative bodies ranging from British Parliament to the Reichstag. 
However, it was not until 1917 that communism attained a real foot-
hold as the Bolsheviks seized control of  the Russian government. The 
formation of  the USSR, and its subsequent expansion, rapidly spread 
communism through much of  Eastern Europe. Following the Second 
World War, the territory conquered by the Allies was essentially divided 
into two spheres of  influence, each dominated by a world power: the 
American-led free markets of  the West, and the Soviet-command econ-
omies of  the East.
The United States had experienced highly atypical economic re-
sults from the war. Because the war had not touched the continental 
United States, the nation not only did not experience economic down-
turn, but it had indeed seen its economy bolstered by the war effort. 
The already-formidable US economy had now become a behemoth, 
especially compared to its significantly weakened European counter-
parts. The suffering of  Europe did not go unnoticed by the Americans. 
The destruction of  Europe was indeed of  great concern to the US, as 
was the potential spread of  communism. In an effort to combat these 
crises, the Truman administration undertook the most ambitious for-
eign aid program in human history, the Marshall Plan.
Although the plan is sometimes portrayed as a purely benevolent 
act on the part of  the Americans, in reality, the motivations behind the 
plan were a mixture of  strategic and altruistic factors. As Diane Kunz 
explains in her article, “The Marshall Plan Reconsidered: A Complex 
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of  Motives,” the plan had many factors that led to its creation. The 
primary factors cited by Kunz are the United States had a vested interest 
in having stronger allies in Europe, the United States wanted, literally, 
to buy an increased measure of  influence in the region and, the Amer-
icans believed that maintaining a positive image of  the capitalist United 
States would stop the spread of  communism and prevent communist 
parties from obtaining more power in Europe.8 Clearly, the motivations 
behind the plan were not as simple as they are often presented to be.
At the time, the idea of  sending millions of  dollars overseas to help 
rebuild Europe was neither universally accepted nor popular. Many 
in the general public and in high levels of  government were not con-
vinced of  the necessity of  such large amounts of  foreign aid. The 
swaying point for many skeptics came in the form of  a speech given by 
Secretary of  State George Marshall, which was has not been intended 
to be nationally released. Invited to speak at an alumni association event 
at Harvard University in 1947, Marshall decided to speak on the need 
for American intervention in the European economic crisis. The speech 
would go on to be published and distributed by the State Department 
and is often seen as the beginning of  the process that eventually led to 
the Marshall Plan. In the speech, Secretary Marshall outlined the need 
for American assistance in Europe, saying,
In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation of  
Europe the physical loss of  life, the visible destruction of  
cities, factories, mines and railroads was correctly estimated, 
but it has become obvious during recent months that this 
visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislo-
cation of  the entire fabric of  European economy. [. . .] The 
rehabilitation of  the economic structure of  Europe quite 
evidently will require a much longer time and greater effort 
than had been foreseen.9
Marshall went on to explain that the need for help was not only the 
need for monetary infusion in order to help the economies of  Europe 
to get back on their feet, but also a need of  a source of  confidence to 
8 Diane Kunz, “The Marshall Plan Reconsidered: A Complex of  Motives,” 
Foreign Affairs 75, no. 3 (May 1997): 162–170. https://doi.org/10.2307/20048105.
9 George Marshall, “The Marshall Plan.” (Speech, Harvard University Com-
mencement, Cambridge, MA, June 5, 1947). https://www.marshallfoundation.org/
marshall/the-marshall-plan/marshall-plan-speech/.
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kick start economic cooperation across the whole of  Europe. Marshall 
drove this point home by saying,
The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring 
the confidence of  the European people in the economic fu-
ture of  their own countries and of  Europe as a whole. The 
manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be 
able and willing to exchange their products for currencies 
the continuing value of  which is not open to question.10
The quotation illustrates another area in which the plan was far 
more complex than many realize. The Marshall Plan was not simply 
handing out of  a few billion dollars in the hopes that it would help 
Europe bounce back, but it marked the beginning of  a new American 
doctrine when it came to the markets of  Europe, under which the in-
creased integration and cooperation of  the economies of  Europe would 
be fully backed.
Following the speech, deliberations began as to how to put these 
concepts into action, and after months of  debate and modifications, 
the Marshall Plan finally became more than just an idea. The Foreign 
Assistance Act and the Economic Assistance Act constitute the hard 
documentation of  the plan and were passed in 1948. The Foreign As-
sistance Act states that its purposes are three-fold:
(1) promoting industrial and agricultural production in said 
countries;
(2) furthering the restoration or maintenance of  the sound-
ness of  European currencies, budgets, and finances; and
(3) facilitating and stimulating the growth of  international 
trade of  participating countries with one another and with 
other countries by appropriate measures including reduction 
of  barriers which may hamper such trade.11
Again, it is reiterated in the text of  the law that the purpose behind 
the plan is not to singularly to transfer money to Europe in the hope 
that it would stabilize the situation, but that the plan was intended to 
make Europe integrate economically, knock down trade barriers, and 
unify. The creation of  a unified democratic Europe that shared a love 
of  free trade and capitalism was not only an unintended consequence 
10 Marshall, “The Marshall Plan Speech.”
11 Foreign Assistance Act of  1948, H.R. 169, 80th Cong. (1948).
47Command Versus Commerce
of  the plan but the central purpose for its creation.
The list of  nations offered money under the Marshall Plan was sur- 
prisingly inclusive, including nations that had not been directly involved 
in the war, such as Switzerland. It also offered aid to Eastern European 
nations under Soviet influence and the Soviet Union itself, but all of  
these nations declined the aid; many were compelled to decline by their 
Soviet superiors.12 The nations that accepted and were granted aid in-
cluded Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, France, Greece, West 
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The total amount 
of  aid distributed from 1948 to 1951 was about 12.7 billion dollars, 
with Britain and France as the largest beneficiaries, receiving 3.3 and 
2.3 billion, respectively.13
Although at first glance these numbers may seem to represent large 
quantitates of  capital, upon further inspection it is clear that the afore-
mentioned 12.7 billion could not possibly be the sole cause of  the 
remarkable economic recovery that took place in Europe following the 
war. To explain, between 1947 and 1952 the GDP across nations that 
received Marshall Plan aid grew by about 384 billion dollars.14 In order 
to produce this amount of  economic growth, a government spending 
multiplier (a number used in economics to correctly weigh the impact 
of  spending on GDP) of  slightly over 25 would be required; in reality, 
government spending multipliers typically range between -0.5 to about 
2.5 per the International Monetary Fund.15 This is to say that in order 
for the infusion of  capital to account for the totality of  the growth, the 
spending multiplier would have to be more than ten times larger than 
the uppermost point on the range put forth by the International Mon-
etary Fund, which is essentially impossible,16 which means that the 
12 Geoffrey Roberts, “Moscow and the Marshall Plan: Politics, Ideology and the 
Onset of  the Cold War, 1947,” Europe-Asia Studies 46, no. 8 (1994): 1371–1386. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09668139408412234.
13 New World Encyclopedia, “Marshall Plan.” https://www.newworldencyclo-
pedia.org/entry/Marshall_Plan#Expenditures.
14 Maddison, “Statistics on World Population.”
15 Batini, Nicoletta, Luc Eyraud, Lorenzo Forni, and Anke Weber. “Fiscal 
Multipliers: Size, Determinants, and Use in Macroeconomic Projections.” Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, (September 2014): 8. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
tnm/2014/tnm1404.pdf.
16 These calculations were done by the author using data from Maddison, 
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growth created by the Marshall Plan was clearly not attributable to the 
expenditures alone. Again, this was never its purpose. The creators of  
the Marshall Plan knew that the influx of  capital would not be enough 
to remedy the economic woes of  Europe; the money was simply a means 
to an end which was the greater economic integration and cooperation 
in Europe. The establishment of  organizations such as the European 
Economic Community and European Coal and Steel Community, in 
1957 and 1951, respectively, indicated the attainment of  this end. Re-
gardless of  the motivations behind the Marshall Plan, however, it was 
immensely successful.
The Eastern Bloc, on the other hand, was not receiving the same 
treatment from their Soviet neighbors. On the contrary, many Eastern 
nations (particularly former Axis powers) not only were not receiving 
aid from the USSR, but they were actually being forced to pay large 
reparations to the USSR. East Germany, Hungary, Romania, Finland, 
and Austria all had to pay large sums to the USSR in addition to ship-
ping large amounts of  resources and supplies to them.17 From these 
forced reparation payments, the USSR received nearly as much money 
as the United States gave to Europe in total under the Marshall Plan.18 
The Soviets were extremely concerned about the nations that were un-
der their sphere of  influence being lured into cooperation with the US 
because of  the assistance the US had given its allies. Soviet paranoia was 
the justification behind not allowing Soviet satellite states to participate 
in and receive funds from the Marshall Plan. The formation of  a uni-
fied community in the West resulting from the Marshall Plan further 
concerned the USSR and led to the creation of  COMECON (Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance), which was meant to mimic the eco-
nomic communities of  the West, but in reality it was simply another 
means by which the USSR controlled its neighbors. Stalin did not, in 
“Statistics on World Population,” online supplement to Historical Statistics of  the 
World Economy 1-2008 AD, (http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm); 
New World Encyclopedia, “Marshall Plan”; https://www.newworldencyclopedia.
org/entry/Marshall_Plan#Expenditures; Batini et al., “Fiscal Multipliers.” [It 
should also be noted that Iceland and Czechoslovakia are left out of  these 
calculations due to lack of  GDP data.]
17 Peter Nettl, “German reparations in the Soviet Empire.” Foreign Affairs 29, 
no. 2 (January 1951): 300–307. https://doi.org/10.2307/20030835.
18 Adam Zwass, The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance: The Thorny Path from 
Political to Economic Integration (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1989), 16.
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reality, consider these satellite states as allies but more as a buffer zone 
between the USSR and the West, and, therefore, he felt no need to treat 
them with high regard.
The differences in the relationships between the superpowers and 
their allies does not end there. The USSR had chosen to take a position 
of  absolute power over its neighbors while the United States assumed 
a leading, but not overtly controlling, role. In addition, the Soviet com-
mand system inherently afforded more control over economic func-
tions and trade to the central governing body, in this case the general 
secretary and top party officials of  the USSR. Stalin initially exerted 
strong control over the nations surrounding him in order to create a 
buffer zone between the USSR and the West. As has been noted above, 
Stalin believed that these states would prove to be an economic asset 
for the USSR, but maintaining this imperial control came at a cost. Due 
to the USSR’s neglect of  the economies of  Eastern Europe, the soviet 
satellite states quickly turned from potential assets into liabilities. As 
Valerie Bunce noted,
First, the Soviets established political and economic domi-
nance in the region by creating derivative regimes headed by 
externally dependent elites; as a result, the Soviet role within 
the bloc has eventually evolved from one of  coercion to 
one of  captivity. The rubles expended to hold the bloc to-
gether were not just a serious drain on the Soviet economy. 
They were also spent without any guarantee of  achieving 
their stated objectives, that is, enhancing the political and 
economic solvency of  the region.19
Over the years, the price of  Soviet control of  the region increased 
to the point of  becoming unsustainable. Economic pressure would prove 
to be one of  the factors in the eventual downfall of  the USSR.
The data concerning the varying degrees of  success points to a 
clear supremacy of  Western policy over that of  the East. In the Western 
part of  the continent, the cooperation between the free markets yielded 
stunning economic recoveries. In France, the five years following the 
war were an economic explosion, with the GDP of  the nation more 
19 Valerie Bunce, “The Empire Strikes Back: The Evolution of  the Eastern 
Bloc from a Soviet Asset to a Soviet Liability.” International Organization 39, no. 1 
(1985): 45. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300004859.
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than doubling from $102 billion in 1945 to $220 billion in 1950.20 Cur-
rently, France has one of  the largest and healthiest economies in the 
world. With the tenth-largest GDP in the world at $2.85 trillion and a 
GDP per capita of  $44,100, France has once again assumed a position 
of  great importance on the global economic stage.21 
Likewise, the United Kingdom was able to recover at an astonish-
ing pace. Within the 15 years following the war, the British economy 
grew 33% in size.22 The UK has been able to maintain steady econom-
ic growth over the last 50 years with a GDP growth rate that has sel-
dom been negative. The UK currently boasts the tenth-largest econo-
my in the world with a GDP of  $2.925 trillion.23 Western Europe is 
currently a beacon of  development and economic success to the world 
and has managed to rebuild their infrastructures and nations into some-
thing truly marvelous to behold. 
Eastern Europe, however, did not have such luck during their stint 
of  communist control. Heavy reparation payments and air-tight govern- 
mental economic controls did not allow the booming recoveries that 
were seen in the West. Additionally, Eastern Bloc nations were less in-
centivized to do trade with one another due to individual production 
quotas and lack of  competition. Economic data from the Eastern Bloc 
tells the story of  just how much these practices slowed growth. From 
1950–1956 the nations of  Western Europe outpaced the nations of  
Eastern Europe by approximately 1% GDP growth annually.24 This dif- 
ference is significant, especially considering the sizeable difference in 
the sizes of  the economies of  the two regions. During the span of  
1950–1960 the combined output of  Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia was smaller than the indi-
vidual GDP of  France or Britain on their own.25 The difference not only 
in size but also in respective rate of  growth illustrates just how far in 
the dust the East was in comparison to the West.
20 Maddison, “Statistics on World Population.”
21 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook—Europe:: France:: 
Economy,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
fr.html
22 Federal Reserve Economic Data.
23 Central Intelligence Agency, “World Factbook.”
24 Maddison, “Statistics on World Population.”
25 Maddison, “Statistics on World Population.”
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Until 1991, these patterns continued to affect the nations of  East-
ern Europe in a detrimental manner, but with the fall of  the Soviet 
Union and the subsequent dissolution of  soviet satellite states, the eco-
nomic communities and cooperative nature of  Western Europe began 
to welcome the nations of  the former communist bloc. Additionally, 
upon the fall of  the USSR, the majority of  Eastern Bloc governments 
were replaced by more democratic and capitalist counterparts, changes 
that brought a significant period of  growth in the Eastern Europe. In 
1992, the combined GDP of  the aforementioned seven Eastern Euro-
pean nations equaled only 52% and 59% of  French and British GDP, 
respectively, whereas in 2008, the output of  the Eastern European 
nations was equivalent to 72% of  French and 71% of  British GDP.26 
Eastern Europe is on the rise, and its increased rate of  growth since the 
change from communist to capitalist systems and their subsequent ad-
dition to organizations such as the European Union is no coincidence.
The economic crisis following the second world war was just as real 
and, in many ways, equally as dire as the war had been for the citizenry 
of  Europe. Some of  the world’s greatest powers had been brought to 
their knees. Economies had been reduced to shadows of  their former 
selves, and GDP losses of  30–50% were commonplace among the 
nations of  the continent. The task of  recovering from the war was 
daunting, and the continent was split along eastern and western lines. 
In the East, communist-controlled economics were adopted, and these 
economies were characterized by central governmental planning, gov-
ernment set production quotas for each industry, government resource 
allocation to individuals, and limited and often coerced interchange of  
goods and services among nations. In the West, free markets and free 
trade among nations were the defining characteristics of  the chosen 
economic theories. While the West experienced an immense economic 
boom, the nations of  the East lagged behind and struggled to keep up 
with the growth and prosperity of  their Western counterparts.
The juxtaposition of  the economies of  Eastern and Western Eu-
rope following the second world war provide valuable insights into the 
efficacy of  the systems implemented. Clearly, the market economies of  
the West outperformed the command economies of  the East during 
the 45-year period between the end of  the war and the fall of  Eastern 
communism. Furthermore, the supremacy of  the Western system is 
26 Maddison, “Statistics on World Population.”
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evident in that since the nations of  the East have adopted more West-
ern economic practices and joined Western Economic communities, 
the momentous gap in prosperity East and the West has begun to close. 
Often, the gap in the initial success between the East and the West 
has been written off  as a direct result of  the capital allotted to many 
Western nations as part of  the Marshall Plan. This paper, however, has 
clearly elucidated the fact that these capital allotments were dispropor-
tionately small when compared to the resulting economic recoveries. 
Additionally, it has been made clear that the primary objective of  the 
Marshall Plan was never simply to infuse capital into Europe, but to 
encourage economic cooperation and the implementation of  free mar-
kets in order to foster economic recovery and success. The attainment 
of  these goals and the implementation of  these systems are the reason 
why the Marshall Plan is hailed as the most successful economic recov-
ery plan ever put into effect. These simple concepts of  free trade, eco-
nomic cooperation, and integration were the primary causes of  the 
most impressive economic recovery on record in the West while the 
lack thereof  caused the implosion and downfall of  an empire in the 
East. When presented with the challenge of  building or rebuilding an 
economy, the world should look upon these examples and remember 
what caused the success and the failures of  the nations of  Europe, 
particularly, that the use of  market economies and free trade in Western 
Europe were the primary reasons for its superior post-WWII recovery 
when compared to the command economies of  Eastern Europe. 
The United States in particular should draw from the lessons learned 
from these two regions and their respective success and failure. The 
application of  these post-war policies used in Western Europe could 
prove critically valuable to the United States and her allies in terms of  
stabilizing and rebuilding war-torn regions. The Marshall Plan and its 
accompanying ideas and policies not only helped rebuild the economies 
of  Western Europe, they created stability and strengthened American 
influence in the region. The application of  this doctrine in regions that 
are not as philosophically comparable to the United States as Western 
Europe was may not create the same type of  strong alliances with dem-
ocratic and economically stable nations but would likely still yield an 
increased measure of  stability and prosperity. If  a region is willing to 
implement free-market principles and engage in trade with its neighbors, 
it is in the United States’ best interest to encourage them to do so. 
Joseph Chowen
The “TaiWan aCTS” and The CaSe for STrong 
uS–TaiWan relaTionS
inTroduCTion
The political status of  the island of  Taiwan has been in dispute since 
the end of  the Chinese Civil War.1 This Civil War was fought off  and 
on from 1927 to 1949 between the Communist Party of  China (CPC) 
led by Mao Zedong, and the nationalist Republic of  China (ROC), led 
by the Kuomintang Party (KMT) and Chiang Kai-shek.2 The end of  the 
war saw Chiang and the nationalists expelled to Taiwan while the CPC 
controlled Mainland China.3 The communists founded a new govern-
ment, The People’s Republic of  China (PRC), and claimed ownership 
over all of  China (including the nationalist stronghold in Taiwan) while 
Chiang and his forces continued to consider themselves as the rightful 
government and claimant to Chinese territory.4 This has resulted in the 
status quo of  two de facto states, each regarding themselves as the only 
government of  a single China, which has created political tensions that 
are still felt today. As the PRC continues to grow economically and mil- 
itarily, this complicated situation affects the political stability and future 
of  the Chinese/Taiwanese people, has regional impacts in East Asia, 
1 Sigrid Winkler, “Biding Time: The Challenge of  Taiwan’s International 
Status,” Brookings, November 17, 2011, https://www.brookings.edu/research/
biding-time-the-challenge-of-taiwans-international-status/..
2 Jennifer Lynn Cucchisi, “The Causes and Effects of  the Chinese Civil War, 
1927–1949,” Seton Hall University Dissertations and Theses (ETDs), June 30, 
2002, https://scholarship.shu.edu/dissertations/2361/..
3 Cucchisi, “The Causes and Effects.”.
4  “Adoption of  the Eighth Meeting of  the National Unification Committee 
Date: August 1, the Republic of  China.” 大陸資訊及研究中心. Mainland Affairs 
Council, Republic of  China (Taiwan). https://www.mac.gov.tw/MAIRC/cp.
aspx?n=B64DFEE4D7371490&s=AC4A64318B66ADCA.
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and national security implications for the United States.5 The United 
States currently recognizes the PRC as the government of  China6 though 
it maintains unofficial relations with Taiwan through the Taiwan Rela-
tions Act,7 and the Taiwan Travel Act of  2018.8 However,  it benefits 
the United States to maintain a strong relationship with Taiwan to pro-
mote democracy and defend US geopolitical interests of  a liberal, rules 
based international system; a system the PRC has undercut through 
aggressive economic and military expansion.9 This paper aims to exam-
ine the history of  US relations with the PRC and Taiwan, including the 
text and implications of  the two aforementioned “Taiwan Acts,” and 
finally why a robust US–Taiwan relationship is in the best interest of  
the United States. 
hiSTory of uS–Sino relaTionS 1927–1979
In 1927, the Island of  Taiwan and most of  Mainland China were 
under the control of  the nationalist Republic of  China and Chiang Kai-
shek.10 The United States, ideologically opposed to communism and 
the CPC, officially recognized the ROC.11 Chiang’s distrust of  the grow-
ing CPC was high, and he feared that they would take over China,12 so 
during that same year he turned his forces on the CPC. Thi+s is widely 
5 Ana Nicolaci da Costa, “How the World Is Grappling with China’s Rising 
Power,” BBC News, October 26, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/busi-
ness-45948692.
6 US Department of  State, “U.S. Relations With China,” US Department of  State, 
August 22, 2018, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-china/.
7 “Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8, 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.),” American 
Institute in Taiwan, January 1, 1979, https://www.ait.org.tw/our-relationship/
policy-history/key-u-s-foreign-policy-documents-region/taiwan-relations-act/.
8 “H.R.535 - Taiwan Travel Act,” Congress.gov, March 16, 2018, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/535/text.
9 Kori Schake, “China Has Been Welcomed into the Liberal World Order, but 
It Isn’t Held to the Same Standard,” ABC News, December 2, 2018, https://www.
abc.net.au/news/2018-12-03/china-xi-jinping-donald-trump-chinese-military-eco-
nomic-power/10568398.
10 Cucchisi, Chinese Civil War.
11 US Department of  State, “A Guide to the United States’ History of  Recogni-
tion, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776: China,” US 
Department of  State, https://history.state.gov/countries/china.
12 Cucchisi, Chinese Civil War.
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considered the start of  the Chinese Civil War.13 The Civil War was in-
terrupted by the Japanese invasion of  Chinese territory in 1937, during 
which The United States provided military support to the united Chi-
nese forces.14 After the end of  World War II, Taiwan held China’s seat 
at the United Nations and enjoyed military relations with the United 
States through the “Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States 
and the Republic of  China.”15 The treaty granted the United States “the 
right to dispose such United States land, air and sea forces in and about 
Taiwan [. . .] as may be required for their defense, as determined by mu- 
tual agreement.”16 The United States followed through on this and in 
1954 deployed ground and naval assets to Taiwan to dissuade the com-
munists. The US continued to maintain close ties with the ROC until 
the 1970s, when, seeking to exploit a division between Soviet Russia and 
the PRC, the US normalized relations with the PRC and later swapped 
their recognition of  the government of  China from the ROC to the 
PRC in the “Joint Communique on the Establishment of  Diplomatic 
Relations Between the United States of  America and the People’s Re-
public of  China.”17 Part of  the communique states: 
The United States of  America recognizes the Government 
of  the People’s Republic of  China as the sole legal Govern-
ment of  China. Within this context, the people of  the United 
States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unoffi-
cial relations with the people of  Taiwan. The People’s Re-
public of  China and the United States of  America reaffirm 
the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai 
Communique and emphasize once again that:
13 Cucchisi, Chinese Civil War.
14 Donald M. Bishop, “The United States and China During World War II: An 
Operational Outline,” US Embassy and Consulates in China, September 15, 2005, 
https://china.usembassy-china.org.cn/our-relationship/policy-history/io/
shared-sacrifice-u-s-china-cooperation-world-war-ii/united-states-chi-
na-world-war-ii-operational-outline/.
15 “Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of  
China, December 2, 1954,” Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_cen-
tury/chin001.asp.
16  Mutual Defense Treaty.
17 “Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of  Diplomatic Relations between 
the People’s Republic of  China and the United States of  America (December 16, 
1978),” Embassy of  the People’s Republic of  China in the United States of  
America, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/doc/ctc/t36256.htm.
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Both wish to reduce the danger of  international military 
conflict. Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific 
region or in any other region of  the world and each is op-
posed to efforts by any other country or group of  countries 
to establish such hegemony.18
Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf  of  any third party or to en-
ter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other 
states. The Government of  the United States of  America acknowledg-
es the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part 
of  China.19
This had three significant impacts. First, The United States recog-
nized the PRC as the sole government of  China. Second, The United 
States was allowed unofficial communications and relations with Tai-
wan. Finally, the United States and the PRC would agree to not seek 
hegemony over the Asia Pacific region. As formal recognition of  the 
PRC changed the US political view of  China, this monumental com-
munique leads directly to the next era of  US and China-Taiwan rela-
tions, with the 1979 passage of  the Taiwan Relations Act.
The TaiWan relaTionS aCT, Third Communique, and Six 
aSSuranCeS
While the United States recognized the PRC as “China”, it still 
shared relations and military alliances with Taiwan. To rectify this, in 
April of  1979 President Carter signed perhaps what is the most im-
portant legislation regarding US Foreign Policy with China-Taiwan: the 
Taiwan Relations Act.20 The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), set out to 
define US-Taiwan relations, as well as provide a mechanism for the US 
to supply Taiwan with arms in order to deter Chinese military action. 
In accordance with Act 10 of  the defense treaty with Taiwan, as the 
TRA revoked formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the military al-
liance was also terminated in 1980.21 However, the United States still 
wished to have another anti-communist ally to counter China in the 
region. Though the TRA does not give official diplomatic recognition 
18 Joint Communique.
19 Joint Communique.
20 Taiwan Relations Act.
21 Mutual Defense Treaty.
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to Taiwan, it did establish the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT),22 a 
corporate, nonprofit entity authorized to manage relations between the 
United States and Taiwan. The passage of  the TRA holds implications 
for the US–PRC relationship as well; the act stipulates that Taiwan’s 
future should be determined peacefully, and that the United States may 
provide weapons to aid Taiwan’s defense.23 The act is a message to the 
PRC that the US will consider any attempt to take Taiwan by force as a 
matter of  US interest and that the US, whether through arms transfers 
or direct military force, will defend Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty. In the 
Joint Communique published in August of  1982, the United States de-
clared its intention to limit arms sales to Taiwan in order to preserve 
normalized US-China relations.24 In 1982, the United States clarified by 
passing the “Six Assurances” to Taiwan,25 which stated: 
1. The United States would not set a date for termination of  
arms sales to Taiwan.
2. The United States would not alter the terms of  the Taiwan 
Relations Act.
3. The United States would not consult with China in advance 
before making decisions about US arms sales to Taiwan. 
4. The United States would not mediate between Taiwan and 
China.
5. The United States would not alter its position about the sov-
ereignty of  Taiwan, which was, that the question was one to 
be decided peacefully by the Chinese themselves, and would 
not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with China.
6. The United States would not formally recognize Chinese sov- 
ereignty over Taiwan. 
These assurances set a formal guide to US–Taiwan relations, which, in 
practice, would ensure that US military support of  the island would 
22 “Our Relationship,” American Institute in Taiwan, https://www.ait.org.tw/
our-relationship/.
23 Taiwan Relations Act.
24 “Joint Communique of  the United States of  America and the Peoples 
Republic of  China,” CIA.gov, August 21, 2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/
readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83B00551R000200010003-4.pdf.
25 “The ‘Six Assurances’ to Taiwan,” Taiwan Documents Project, July 1982, http://
www.taiwandocuments.org/assurances.htm.
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continue, and that the island would remain a thorn in the US–PRC re-
lationship. The TRA stands as a key piece in US–Sino relations, provid-
ing enough ambiguity for the US to claim that it does not recognize the 
ROC, while providing the legal basis to ensure the US does have a de 
facto partner in the region.
The riSe of China and The TaiWan TraVel aCT 
Since the passage of  the TRA the geopolitical balance of  power in 
the region has changed. China reformed economically and has grown 
to rival the United States,26 and has stated ambitions to be a global pow-
er by 2050.27 Not only has China’s economic competition increased, but 
US interests in democracy has led to an ideological preference in sup-
porting Taiwan, as Taiwan transitioned from a one-party state under 
the KMT to a flourishing democracy by the start of  the twenty-first 
century. Taiwan now has multiple parties, most notably with the Dem-
ocratic Progressive Party (DPP) emerging as an independence leaning 
alternative to the KMT.28 Meanwhile, China would infamously crack 
down on pro-democracy protests in 198929 and has continued to con-
solidate the power of  the Communist Party,30 this has raised fears that 
a Chinese led world order would ignore human rights.31 In recent years, 
26 “World Economic Outlook (October 2019) GDP Based on PPP, Share of  
World:Percent of  World,” International Monetary Fund, October 2019, https://www.
imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPSH@WEO/OEMDC/WEOWORLD/ADVEC/
CHN/USA.
27 Ting Shi and Bloomberg News, “Xi Jinping Lays out Blueprint to Make  
China a Global Superpower by 2050,” National Post, October 18, 2017, https://
nationalpost.com/news/world/xi-jinping-lays-out-plan-to-make-china-a-global-su-
perpower-by-2050.
28 Taipei Bureau, “Timeline: Taiwan’s Road to Democracy,” Reuters, December 
12, 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-election-timeline/time-
line-taiwans-road-to-democracy-idUSTRE7BC0E320111213.
29 Agence France-Presse, “China Says Tiananmen Crackdown Was ‘Correct’ 
Policy,” The Guardian, June 2, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/
jun/02/china-says-tiananmen-crackdown-was-correct-policy.
30 Alexandra Fiol-Mahon, “Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign: The 
Hidden Motives of  a Modern-Day Mao,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, August 17, 
2018, https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/08/xi-jinpings-anti-corruption-cam-
paign-the-hidden-motives-of-a-modern-day-mao/.
31 Chris Walsh, “China’s World Order Doesn’t Play Well with Democracy,” Real-
ClearWorld, August 20, 2019, https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2019/08/ 
20/chinas_world_order_doesnt_play_well_with_democracy_113077.html.
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the United States’ strategy in the region has intensified on containing 
China. Shifting away from a main focus on terrorism towards a global 
focus on rival powers, in 2017 the National Security Strategy (NSS) was 
published, highlighting that China’s rise “risks diminishing the sover-
eignty of  many states in the Indo-Pacific”.32 Overall, the United States 
has recognized China as a strategic competitor for regional hegemony, 
with the US Department of  Defense (DOD) labeling China as a rising 
threat to national security,33 and with the 2017 NSS being reinforced 
with the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which calls for a renewed long-
term focus on China.34 In light of  this the United States has passed two 
more acts directed at Taiwan, the first being the Taiwan Relations Act 
Affirmation and Naval Vessel Transfer Act of  2014,35 which allowed 
for the sale of  advanced warships, such as Oliver Hazard Perry-class 
frigates, to Taiwan.
The second act was the Taiwan Travel Act of  2018,36 which made 
US–Taiwan relations more official by allowing peer-to-peer travel and 
meetings between US and Taiwanese officials, including defense offi-
cials. This act can be seen as a continuation of  the 1979 Taiwan Rela-
tions Act, not only by giving Taiwan the recognition of  official visits by 
US officials, but by setting a precedent for a more official recognition 
of  Taiwan. In particular, the act states “visits to a country by United 
States Cabinet members and other high-ranking officials are an indica-
tor of  the breadth and depth of  ties between the United States and 
32 National Security Strategy of  the United States of  America DECEM-
BER2017 https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Fi-
nal-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
33 David Vergun, “China a Rising Threat to National Security, Say DOD 
Leaders,” US Department of  Defense, March 13, 2019, https://dod.defense.gov/
News/Article/Article/1784442/china-a-rising-threat-to-national-security-say-dod-
leaders/.
34 “Summary of  the 2018 National Defense Strategy of  the United States of  
America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge,” US Department of  
Defense, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-De-
fense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
35 Cristina Marcos, “House Approves Sale of  Missile Frigates to Taiwan,” The 
Hill, April 7, 2014, https://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/votes/202884-house-
approves-sale-of-missile-frigates-to-taiwan.
36 “H.R.535: Taiwan Travel Act,” Congress.gov, March 16, 2018, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/535.
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such country,”37strongly implying that the meetings between Taiwan 
and the United States could rise to the designation of  state to state re-
lations. As the strategic competition between the United States and 
China grows, the future of  Taiwan and its relations with the United 
States are of  importance to US national security interests.
The CaSe for STrong uS–TaiWan relaTionS
The Taiwan Travel Act heralded Taiwan as “a beacon of  democra-
cy in Asia,” and that “Taiwan’s democratic achievements inspire many 
countries and people in the region.”38 As a leader of  the free world in 
both political influence and military strength, the United States has a 
vested interest in promoting democracy and human rights abroad. Un-
fortunately, China’s grip on its people has tightened, with concentration 
camps for religious minorities39 and the introduction of  a social credit 
score, a system where rights and privileges are allowed depending on 
the deemed amount of  loyalty and efficiency of  the individual.40 Fur-
thermore, China seeks to exercise economic and military control of  the 
region through the militarization of   islands in the South China Sea,41 
and with the Belt and Road Initiative, a transcontinental economic ini-
tiative designed to restructure global trade.42 These actions, combined 
with PRC President Xi Jinping’s wish to unify China and Taiwan under 
the authoritarian regime of  the Communist Party, pose a threat to the 
island and to the United States economic and political standing in 
the world by shifting economic influence to China, thus giving it more 
37 Summary of  National Defense Strategy.
38 “H.R.535: Taiwan Travel Act.”
39 Phil Stewart, “China Putting Minority Muslims in ‘Concentration Camps,’ 
U.S. Says,” Reuters, May 3, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-chi-
na-concentrationcamps/china-putting-minority-muslims-in-concentration-camps-
us-says-idUSKCN1S925.
40 Erin Handley and Bang Xiao, “China Tests Opening Up Social Credit Scores 
to Social Media Platform WeChat with Debt Map,” ABC News, January 23, 2019, 
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-01-24/new-wechat-app-maps-deadbeat-debt-
ors-in-china/10739016.
41 Hannah Beech, “China’s Sea Control Is a Done Deal, ‘Short of  War With the 
U.S.’ ” New York Times, September 20, 2018, https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/09/20/world/asia/south-china-sea-navy.html.
42 China Power Team, “How Will the Belt and Road Initiative Advance China’s 
Interests?” ChinaPower, October 18, 2019, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-belt-
and-road-initiative/.
61The “Taiwan Acts”
influence over other nations. 43 China continues to hack US compa-
nies44 and military networks, and seeks to develop a global navy capable 
of  challenging the United States.45 With this in mind, the United States 
must continue to support the de facto independence of  Taiwan to pro-
mote a free and multipolar Asia. Without US support of  Taiwan and 
substantial US military presence in the region, authoritarian regimes such 
as China or even North Korea might be emboldened to inflict signifi-
cant cyber, economic, or military harm on their democratic rivals with-
out fear of  US intervention.46 While formal recognition of  Taiwan would 
be provocative towards China and increase the likelihood of  war as the 
PRC holds Taiwan as a renegade province, the United States has other 
options: it can forward deploy ground and naval assets into the Indo–
Pacific theater, sell more defensive arms and equipment to Taiwan, and 
work with Taiwan and other regional partners such as Japan to form a 
united diplomatic front against Chinese militarization and expansion. 
ConCluSion
For now, Taiwan enjoys its freedom and economic success, though 
a more ambitious China seeks to eventually unify and dominate the is-
land. While China may not be in the military or economic position to 
take on both the United States and Taiwan, it can continue to militarize 
and prepare itself  for such a conflict. Therefore, out of  concern for 
human rights and for a strong diplomatic partner, the United States 
must not retreat from the Taiwan issue but continue its support of  the 
island economically and militarily through arms sales and regional de-
ployments.  In doing so the United States can send a message that it will 
not retreat from democratic ambition, nor authoritarian aggression. 
43 Thomas P. Cavanna, “What Does China’s Belt and Road Initiative Mean for 
US Grand Strategy?” The Diplomat, June 5, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/ 
06/what-does-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-mean-for-us-grand-strategy/.
44 Zak Doffman, “National Security Threat’ As Chinese Hackers Are ‘Allowed’ 
To Target U.S. Businesses,” Forbes, April 13, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/
zakdoffman/2019/04/13/u-s-businesses-allowing-chinese-government-hackers- 
to-steal-american-secrets/#3b1a3cfca4d4.
45 Steven Lee Myers, “With Ships and Missiles, China Is Ready to Challenge 
U.S. Navy in Pacific,” New York Times, August 29, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/08/29/world/asia/china-navy-aircraft-carrier-pacific.html.
46 Angela O’Mahony, Miranda Priebe, Bryan Frederick, et al., “U.S. Presence 
and the Incidence of  Conflict,” RAND Corporation, 2018, https://www.rand.org/
pubs/research_reports/RR1906.html.
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